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The effectiveness of the legal order in every state is heavily de-
pendent on the state's unauthorized practice laws. These laws im-
pose restrictions on who may practice law and, in important re-
spects, impose controls on the availability of legal services to those
in need of such services and on the quality of the services offered.
This is predominantly a field of state law. Federal unauthorized
practice laws exist but affect only limited segments of the overall le-
gal services market. I Unauthorized practice laws are highly contro-
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1. Federal unauthorized practice laws include restrictions on who may appear before
the federal courts and federal administrative agencies. See infra note 37 and accompanying
text; Thomas J. Andersen, The Federal Practice Exception: Limitations on State Regulation
of Federal Practitioners, 23 W. ST. U. L. REV. 281 (1996). Also, the Federal Constitution
imposes some restrictions on state unauthorized practice laws as it does on most other kinds
of state laws. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 827-28 (1986); Deb-
orah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis
of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 44-96 (1981). On federal unau-
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versial, and many powerful interest groups consider these laws un-
justified monopoly protection of lawyers. Pressures exist to ease
substantially existing restrictions on unauthorized law practice, and
these pressures can be expected to increase in the future. However,
powerful forces within the bar are opposed to easing the restrictions
and favor stricter enforcement of existing legal restraints on unau-
thorized law practice.
The breadth and specificity of legal controls over unauthorized
practice of law can vary greatly, depending on which branch of a
state's government has ultimate power over what these controls shall
be. State courts are quite likely to impose different restrictions from
those that the legislative or executive branches would prefer. Power
allocation among the branches of state government is essentially a
state constitution separation-of-powers issue. As the texts of state
constitutions on separation of powers and power allocation to the
different branches of state government are typically very vague, in-
terpretations of the constitutions' texts are required to determine
how power has been allocated. In a majority of states the state con-
stitution is interpreted as giving the state's courts ultimate power,
and in a few states exclusive power, to determine what is and is not
the unauthorized practice of law. In all states, state courts have a
significant role in enforcing and clarifying unauthorized practice
laws; but in a majority of states, the courts' constitutionally allo-
cated ultimate power over these laws substantially enhances this
role. It is quite apparent that in all states the state's courts will be
important to the success of most any future efforts to revise or more
aggressively enforce unauthorized practice laws; and in a majority of
states, the state's courts will likely be the crucial and final determi-
nants of the success of these efforts.
Although this Article focuses most particularly on the power of
state courts over the unauthorized practice of law, Part I considers
some important aspects of the legal services market and reviews the
legal restrictions that unauthorized practice laws have imposed on
that market. This background information is essential to an ade-
quate understanding of the current importance of the judicial power
issue to the unauthorized practice of law, to the legal services mar-
ket and to the legal profession and other providers of legal services.
Part II reviews the scope of state court constitutional power over un-
thorized practice of law and federal unauthorized practice restrictions, also see William T.
Barker, Extrajurisdictional Practice by Lawyers, 56 BUS. LAW. 1501, 1536-58 (2001).
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authorized law practice and the variations among the states on the
extent of that power. Part III considers the process generally fol-
lowed in interpreting state constitutions. It also considers some of
the justifications advanced by courts and others in their interpretive
conclusions as to the scope of state court power, including power
over unauthorized law practice. In Part IV, some predictions are
made as to where unauthorized practice laws and state court power
over those laws seem headed. In conclusion, Part V stresses that
past state court performance on unauthorized practice matters leaves
much to be desired and considers some proposals for improving the
processes the courts follow in making decisions on these matters.
The extent and effectiveness of restrictions on the unauthorized
practice of law and how state courts should be involved in shaping
and enforcing them are issues of tremendous importance to the fu-
ture of the justice system in this country. The political and judicial
leadership in every state should be more aware of the importance of
these issues and more concerned about how best to solve the prob-
lems they raise. There are many options available for solving unau-
thorized practice and judicial power problems, as subsequent pages
of this Article make clear. It is the responsibility of the political and
judicial leadership in each state to select the best options for that
state as to how these problems should be solved. In many states,
past performance of this leadership in solving these problems has
been disappointing. It is important that there be improvement in the
future, especially since, as seems likely, pressure to enforce and re-
form unauthorized practice laws will escalate.
I. THE MULTIFACETED UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW PROBLEM
Unauthorized practice of law as a field of legal regulation has
several important characteristics meriting special emphasis: the ex-
tensive variation from state to state in what constitutes the unauthor-
ized practice of law; the frequent ambiguity as to who and what are
being regulated; the variety of professions and occupations subject to
unauthorized practice restrictions; and the widespread lack of the
law's enforcement.
The unauthorized practice of law regulates the delivery of legal
services. But what are legal services? The term "legal services" as
used here is in accord with what is usually meant by the term. Le-
gal services consist principally of one or more of the following:
preparation of legal instruments, providing answers to legal prob-
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lems (legal advice), and appearance in a representational capacity
before adjudicatory tribunals. Some additional types of service,
such as negotiating binding legal agreements and urging particular
solutions to pending legal issues when lobbying government legisla-
tive or executive officials, also are often included as forms of legal
service. 2
A. The Competitive Market for Legal Services
Although lawyers concentrate on providing legal services and
in this country are the principal providers of such services, they are
not now, nor have they been at any time in the past, the sole provid-
ers of such services. A wide range of businesses and occupations
have long provided legal services to themselves and others, fre-
quently in competition with lawyers. Among the more influential
and competitively significant of these lawyer competitors are ac-
countants, both CPAs and public accountants; business consultants;
architects; real estate brokers; title insurance companies; commercial
banks; and savings and loan companies. There are many others.3 In
a sense, paralegals, too, are lawyer competitors. These nonlawyers,
employed to perform legal services in many law offices, have be-
come sufficiently numerous and important that they no doubt are re-
ducing the need for junior lawyers in many law offices.4 The com-
petitive market of lawyers and nonlawyers includes many fields of
law, among them government taxation of all kinds, real estate con-
veyancing and financing, corporate mergers and acquisitions, trusts
and estates, debt collection, and immigration. Lawyers even have
2. Types of legal services are described in some definitions of the practice of law. For
examples of such definitions, see infra note 30.
3. Some of the other businesses and occupations that provide legal services that com-
pete with lawyers are life insurance companies; tax return preparation and advice services,
such as H&R Block; collection agencies; insurance adjusters; immigration consultants; lay
practitioners who represent parties in some kinds of administrative agency proceedings; es-
crow agents; and document preparation services. In addition, there is a miscellany of
nonlawyers who provide advice and drafting assistance to mostly lower-income persons in
some communities.
4. A study of paralegals in the mid-1980s estimated that at that time, in U.S. lawof-
fices of all kinds, there was on average one paralegal for every eight lawyers working in
those offices. QUINTIN JOHNSTONE & MARTIN WENGLINSKY, PARALEGALS, PROGRESS
AND PROSPECTS OF A SATELLITE OCCUPATION 4 (1985). If this ratio is still in effect, and
something close to it probably still is, there are about 100,000 paralegals providing legal
services in law offices today. On the role of traditional paralegals, see id., and ABA
Comm'n on Nonlawyer Practice, Nonlawyer Practice in the United States: Summary of the
Factual Record Before the Commission 13-15 (1994).
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some competition from nonlawyers in providing litigation services,
most notably in litigation preparation and in representation of parties
before some administrative agencies.
One difference between lawyers and nonlawyers as legal ser-
vices providers is that, collectively, lawyers as a profession provide
all kinds of legal services and in all fields of law, whereas each of
the nonlawyer professions and occupations, except paralegals, most
always operate in more limited legal service spheres. For example,
real estate brokers limit their legal services almost exclusively to
those required in conveyancing and financing of real estate, and col-
lection agencies limit their legal services to those required in collect-
ing delinquent debts. Others, such as accountants, provide a some-
what greater range of legal services, although traditionally focusing
heavily on legal problems related to auditing and income taxation.
The legal services market involves not only competition be-
tween lawyers and nonlawyers but also competition among lawyers.
Lawyers compete with one another for clients and this competition
has become more intense in recent years. Several aspects of this in-
traprofessional competition are of particular relevance to issues of
unauthorized practice of law: multijurisdictional practice by lawyers
(also known as interjurisdictional practice); legal services provided
by house counsel whose practice base is in a state where they are not
admitted to practice; and multidisciplinary practice, including full-
time lawyer employees of business and professional firms, owned
and controlled by nonlawyers, that provide legal services to clients
of their nonlawyer employer.
Many lawyers in the course of their practice engage in multi-
jurisdictional practice representing clients in matters that require le-
gal services to be provided in two or more states: the state where the
lawyer's practice is principally based and one or more other states.
The legal work needed in the other state or states can include such
services as factual investigation, taking depositions, settlement nego-
tiation, arbitration or appearance before a court or administrative
agency. 5 Lawyers who themselves go to another state to provide
these services often are competing with the other state's lawyers,
5. On multijurisdictional practice by lawyers and its unauthorized practice implications,
see WOLFRAM, supra note I, at 865-74; Symposium, Ethics and the Multijurisdictianal
Practice afLaw, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 657 (1995); Barker, supra note 1; Quintin Johnstone,
Multijurisdictianal Practice afLaw: Its Prevalence and Its Risks, 74 CONN. B. J. 343 (2000)
(reviewing a Connecticut Bar Foundation symposium on multijurisdictional practice).
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those likely to be retained to do the work if the initially retained
lawyers had not done SO. 6 Intraprofessional competition can be a
significant consequence of multijurisdictional law practice. Multi-
jurisdictional practice is not, of course, restricted to interstate prac-
tice. It also may involve practices concerning the law of different
nations in which lawyers licensed in the United States do some of
their work abroad or foreign lawyers provide legal services in this
country. This international form of multijurisdictional practice is
less extensive than interstate practice but can also result in unauthor-
ized practice violations,
A subgroup of lawyers that have caused special unauthorized
practice concerns are house counsel admitted to practice law, but not
in the state where they are based, and who provide legal services to
their employer but not to clients or customers of their employer. 7
Most of these house counsel are employed by large corporations that
do business nationally, many of them even internationally. The
problem, of course, is that the lawyers are admitted to practice in
one jurisdiction but most of their legal work is in their home office
jurisdiction, a jurisdiction where they are not legally authorized to
practice. A common reason for these house counsel not being ad-
mitted to practice where their principal office is located is that their
employer has widely scattered offices and rather frequently moves
its house lawyers from an office base in one state to another base of
operations in another state. These moves may be temporary, which
deters the lawyers from seeking admission to practice in the state
where they presently are based when, as is typical, admission may
be a slow, protracted process. There are no reliable records on how
many house counsel there are who are not admitted in the state
6. A more extensive form of multijurisdictional law practice is the lawyer based in one
state representing clients in another state when all the legal services are provided in the other
state. This type of multijurisdictional practice is particularly likely with lawyers based near
the border of another state and who seek and acquire clients in the adjoining state.
7. See Carol A. Needham, The Multijurisdictional Practice ofLaw and the Corporate
Lawyer: New Rules for a New Generation of Legal Practice, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 1075
(1995); Carol A. Needham, Permitting Lawyers to Participate in Multidisciplinary Practices:
Business as Usual or the End of the Profession as We Know It? 84 MINN. L. REV. 1315,
1356-58 (2000) [hereinafter Needham, Permitting Lawyers] (including a list of states that as
of 2000 permitted out-of-state in-house counsel to provide legal services for their employer;
Oregon has recently joined this list, see infra note 45).
A complicating aspect of the work of some of these house counsel is that on occasion
they also may provide some legal services to employees of the corporation. Local lawyers
admitted in the state often are particularly resentful of this competition.
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where their present principal office is located but nationwide there
quite possibly are over a thousand of them. Even some general
counsel of major corporations are among these house counsel not
admitted in the state where they do most of their work.
Another kind of legal service delivery that is enhancing compe-
tition among lawyers is multidisciplinary practice. This is a type of
practice in which the provider of legal services provides both legal
and nonlegal services to clients. 8 Many multidisciplinary practice
operations are by firms, such as the big accounting firms, that em-
ploy lawyers but are owned or controlled by nonlawyers. Most
forms of multidisciplinary practice also enhance competition be-
tween law firms and some well-established and economically and
politically powerful professional and business firms owned and con-
trolled by nonlawyers. Multidisciplinary practice has recently be-
come highly controversial, and proposals with considerable support
have been advanced to more effectively restrict and regulate it.
However, there also is strong support for permitting multidiscipli-
nary practice to take over even more of the legal services market in
the United States.9 A scattering of support for multidisciplinary
8. The ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice defined a multidisciplinary
practice firm as follows: "a partnership, professional corporation, or other association or
entity that includes lawyers and nonlawyers and has as one, but not all, of its purposes the
delivery of legal services to a client(s) other than the multidisciplinary practice itself or that
holds itself out to the public as providing nonlegal, as well as legal, services." ABA
Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of Delegates 5 (Aug. 1999)
[hereinafter ABA Comm'n, August 1999 Report].
9. A vast literature on multidisciplinary practice has recently developed. For the vari-
ous forms of multidisciplinary practice and diverse views on the merits of this type of prac-
tice, see, e.g., ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Background Paper on Multidis-
ciplinary Practice: Issues and Developments (Jan. 1999); ABA Comm'n, August 1999
Report; ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House ofDelegates (May
2000) [hereinafter ABA Comm'n, May 2000 Report]; ABA Law Practice and Mgmt. Sec-
tion, Symposium, Multidisciplinary Practice, Staying Competitive and Adapting to Change
(2001); N.Y. Law School's Ctr. for Int'l Law, Symposium, Multidisciplinary Practice (Oct.
1999); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Special Comm. on the Law Governing Firm Structure and Op-
eration, Preserving the Core Values of the American Legal Profession, The Place ofMultid-
isciplinary Practice in the Law Governing Lawyers (April 2000) [hereinafter N.Y. State Bar
Ass 'n, April 2000 Report]; Symposium, The Future of the Profession: A Symposium on Mul-
tidisciplinary Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1083 (2000); Philip S. Anderson, Facing Up to
Multidisciplinary Practice, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 473 (2000); Sydney M. Cone III, Views on
Multidisciplinary Practice With Particular Reference to Law and Economics, New York, and
North Carolina, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2001); Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men
Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of Purchasing Legal Services from Lawyers in a Multidisci-
plinary Partnership, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 219 (2000) (Professor Daly was the Reporter
for the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, and her article is a helpful review
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practice has come from solo and small-firm lawyers. Some of these
lawyers who serve ordinary people and small businesses are at-
tracted to the possibilities multidisciplinary practice offers of enter-
ing into partnership with nonlawyer service groups such as family
counselors, small accounting firms and local real estate brokers. lo
Multidisciplinary practice is also becoming much more common in
other parts of the world, especially Europe, and is a concern to
those U.S. law firms that are operating abroad. II Some see multid-
isciplinary practice as a product of globalization and a result of mar-
ket forces that cannot be stopped. 12 Proponents of multidisciplinary
practice stress that this type of practice can increase efficiency and
reduce the cost of legal service delivery, with resulting lower fees to
consumers of these services both from multidisciplinary practices
and from lawyers forced to compete with multidisciplinary prac-
ticesY Multidisciplinary practice opponents assert that this kind of
practice, especially fully integrated multidisciplinary practice, seri-
ously threatens the quality and reliability of legal services by weak-
ening adherence to the standards of professional conduct binding on
lawyers. Professional standards, it is claimed, that are particularly
vulnerable to violation when this kind of practice is engaged in are
the independence of participating lawyers in advising and represent-
and analysis of the Commission's actions); Jenny B. Davis, The Enron Factor, 88 A.B.A. 1.
40 (April 2002); John S. Dzienkowski & Robert Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and the
American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery ofLegal Services
in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83 (2000); Lawrence 1. Fox, Old Wine
in Old Bottles: Preserving Professional Independence, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 971 (1999).
10. See James W. Jones, Focusing the Multidisciplinary Practice Debate: Historical
and Practical Perspectives, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 989,994-95 (1999).
11. On multidisciplinary practice in other countries, see N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, April
2000 Report, supra note 9, at ch. 9; Daly, supra note 9, at 227-40 (considering the delivery
of legal services by the major accounting firms outside the United States); Ramon Mullerat,
The Multidisciplinary Practice ofLaw in Europe, 501. LEGAL EDUC. 481 (2000); Laurel S.
Terry, A Primer on Multidisciplinary Practices: Should the "No" Rule Become a New Rule?,
72 TEMP. L. REV. 869,883-90 (1999) (global responses to multidisciplinary practice).
12. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 9, at 475. Anderson is a former American Bar
Association (ABA) President and initiated the ABA Commission study of multidisciplinary
practice.
13. See, e.g., Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 9, at 117-27; Daniel R. Fischel, Mul-
tidisciplinary Practice, 55 Bus. LAW. 951, 972-73 (2000).
Another argument for multidisciplinary practice often advanced by proponents is the
convenience to clients of "one-stop shopping" that multidisciplinary practice makes possible.
See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 9, at 117-18; John H. Matheson & Edward S. Ad-
ams, Not "If" but "How": Reflecting on the ABA Commission's Recommendations on Multid-
isciplinary Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1269, 1299-1300 (2000).
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ing clients, client loyalty, restrictions on conflict of interest and re-
strictions on disclosure of client confidences. 14
The most controversial form of multidisciplinary practice is
what is often referred to as the fully integrated model. Under this
model, a firm owned and controlled by nonlawyers provides its cli-
ents with both legal and nonlegal services, and much of the legal
work is performed by lawyer employees of the firm. IS Consolidated
service delivery of this sort may result in greater efficiencies and
cost savings and the possibility of lower legal service fees to cli-
ents. 16 The major accounting firms are the most frequently noted
examples of fully integrated multidisciplinary practices. They pro-
vide a broad range of services to their clients that include not only
conventional accounting and tax return preparation services, but also
legal services required for such matters as business planning, finan-
cial planning, estate planning and litigation support, including dis-
pute resolution, investigation and discovery. 17 The big accounting
firms employ thousands of lawyers in the United States to provide
legal services to fIrm clients, much of this work extending well be-
yond the kinds of services that accounting firms have traditionally
provided their clients. 18 Fully integrated mUltidisciplinary practice
14. See. e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, April 2000 Report. supra note 9, at ch. 11; Fox,
supra note 9, at 971 (Fox is a former chairman of both the ABA Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility and the ABA Section of Litigation); Lawrence J. Fox,
Dan's World: A Free Enterprise Dream; An Ethics Nightmare, 55 Bus. LAW. 1533 (2000)
(responding to Fischel's article, supra note 13); David Kairys, Some Concerns About Con-
text and Concentration ofPower. 72 TEMP. L. REV. 1019 (1999). Also see the assessments
of the rewards and risks of multidisciplinary practice in Daly, supra note 9, at 263-71.
The standards of professional conduct mentioned in the text just above often are re-
ferred to as the core values of the legal profession. The ABA Commission on Multidiscipli-
nary Practice in one of its reports stresses that its pro-multidisciplinary practice recommen-
dations safeguard the core values of the legal profession. ABA Comm'n, August 1999
Report. supra note 8, at CIO-Cll.
15. On the fully integrated model, see ABA Comm'n, August 1999 Report. supra note
8, at C4; Daly, supra note 9, at 226.
16. On the benefits claimed for multidisciplinary practice, see N.Y. State Bar Ass'n,
Special Comm. on Multi-Disciplinary Practice and the Legal Profession, Report 9-11 (Jan.,
1999); Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 9, at 117-27.
17. See Terry, supra note 11, at 881.
18. One report numbers the total cadre of lawyers in the United States employed full-
time by the Big Five accounting firms to have been about 6,000 as of 1998. Aggressive re-
cruiting by these firms in 1999 presumably increased that number. See N.Y. State Bar
Ass'n, April 2000 Report, supra note 9, at 173-74. No doubt the number of lawyers em-
ployed by the large accounting firms in the United States has declined recently due to more
stringent financial times and the near collapse of the Arthur Andersen firm.
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is not, however, restricted to the big accounting firms, Other kinds
of nonlawyer firms operate similarly; among them many investment
banks, commercial banks, title insurance companies, management
consulting firms and some smaller accounting firms. It is also pos-
sible that the multidisciplinary practice model will eventually spread
to additional kinds of businesses, including such mass-customer
goods or services operations as Sears Roebuck, American Express
and H&R Block. 19
Fully integrated multidisciplinary practice is not the only mul-
tidisciplinary services model; others are possible and have at least
some adoption in this country. Common objectives of these other
models are to provide an attractive alternative, both legally and
competitively, to the fully integrated model typified by the big ac-
counting firms, and also to provide an alternative that will make law
firms more profitable. One of the alternatives to the fully integrated
model is for a law firm to broaden its services and use firm person-
nel to make available not only legal services but substantial nonlegal
services as well, often provided by nonlawyer specialists qualified in
disciplines other than law and who are employees of the law firm.
If the nonlegal services provided are extensive enough, the law firm
in essence becomes a fully integrated multidisciplinary practitioner.
Some law firms have moved heavily in this direction, making avail-
able nonlegal services such as urban planning and land use, account-
ing and financial advisory services, and using nonlawyer specialists
who are employees of the firm or are retained by the firm or the cli-
ent to provide most of the nonlegal services.20
A variation on the multidisciplinary practice model in which a
law firm's personnel, lawyers and nonlawyer employees, provide
both legal and nonlegal services to firm clients is for a law firm to
share in the benefits of multidisciplinary practice by developing a
19. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 9, at 127 (suggesting that permitting large
retailers to hire lawyers and offer legal services at a reasonable cost could be a potentially
important source of legal services for many low- and middle-income persons who presently
are underserved by lawyers).
H&R Block currently is a nonlawyer mass-customer service operation for income tax
preparation. Another nonlawyer mass legal service operation is We the People, a rapidly
expanding document preparation service that now has over 100 offices in sixteen states. On
We the People, see Lincoln Brunner, Nonlawyer Legal Service Industry Mushrooms, 20
LEGAL ASSISTANT TODAY 16 (Nov.-Dec. 2002); Dishing Up Documents, Franchise-Style,
88 A.B.A. J. 40 (Aug. 2002).
20. On this model, referred to as the cooperative model, see ABA Comm'n, August
1999 Report, supra note 8, at C2-C3; Daly, supra note 9, at 224.
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special nonemployee relationship with one or more nonlawyer pro-
viders of services. The relationship may be a partnership, an own-
ership relationship or a relationship based on contract. Under the
partnership model, the law firm and nonlawyer partners share legal
fees and law firm management responsibilities. 21 Under the owner-
ship model, the law firm establishes an ancillary business unit, in es-
sence a subsidiary, that is largely owned and controlled by the law
firm's partners and to which the law firm refers nonlegal work.22
The essential feature of the contract model is that a law firm creates
a long-term contract affiliation with an independent firm that pro-
vides nonlegal services and in which neither the law firm nor its
partners have an ownership interest. Pursuant to the contract, the
two firms refer matters to one another, often working together on a
particular client's problems and frequently advertising the relation-
ship in their respective markets. 23
The massive market in the United States for legal services is
growing and becoming more competitive as the economy expands
geographically, new legal controls are introduced and more legal
service providers enter the market or seek to increase their share of
that market. Lawyers, the principal legal service providers, are
faced with greater competition both from nonlawyers and from one
another, including from lawyers not admitted to practice in states
where they are providing legal services. Little empirical study
attention has been given to determining with precision the conse-
quences of this competition on lawyers and law firms in recent years
but some consequences are obvious. A few examples are these: (1)
many private law firms have lost an extensive amount of work as a
result of corporations reducing their legal service costs by establish-
ing or expanding their own law departments, with lawyer employees
21. This model is often referred to as the command and control model and, where le-
gally permissible, is subject to certain restrictions, including that the sole purpose of the
partnership must be the provision of legal services. On this model, see ABA Cumm'n, Au-
gust 1999 Report, supra note 8, at C3; Daly, supra note 9, at 224-25. This model is permit-
ted in the District of Columbia. See D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 5.4 (2003).
22. See ABA Comm'n, August 1999 Report, supra note 8, at C3; N.Y. State Bar
Ass'n, April 2000 Report, supra note 9, at 342-59; Daly, supra note 9, at 225. See also
Lowell J. Noteboom, Professions in Convergence: Taking the Next Step, 84 MINN. L. REV.
1359, 1364-74 (2000) (describing the ancillary business operations of twenty-one different
U.S. law firms). This model is also known as the law-related services/ancillary business
model.
23. See ABA Comm'n, August 1999 Report, supra note 8, at C3-C4; N.Y. State Bar
Ass'n, April 2000 Report, supra note 9, at 342-59; Daly, supra note 9, at 225-26.
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of the corporation performing much of the corporation's legal work;
(2) small local law firms have lost work heavily to larger law firms
that have opened branch offices and that provide a wide range of le-
gal services, often at higher quality than their local competitors; and
(3) lawyers and law firms have lost work to nonlawyers and their
business and professional entities that have moved into the legal ser-
vices market. In one massive legal services market in particular,
nonlitigation legal services for middle- and lower-middle-income
persons, lawyers appear to have made surprisingly little effort to
counter nonlawyer competition by increasing efficiency and reducing
legal fees. 24 Major structural innovations in law firms, comparable
to H&R Block in tax services, have not emerged to serve the mid-
dle- and lower-middle-income legal services nonlitigation market.
The attitude of many lawyers seems to be that if the competition be-
comes too great we will just move out of highly competitive types of
practice and into other practices, instead of trying to become more
competitive.
B. The Law of Unauthorized Law Practice
In every state unauthorized law practice as a separate body of
law is a patchwork of legal rules and concepts from a variety of
sources: court rules, statutes, administrative regulations, judicial
opinions, and the state's constitution.25 The underlying purpose of
this field of law is regulating who may provide legal services and
under what circumstances. Violators of unauthorized practice laws
are subject to criminal sanctions, unauthorized practice is a misde-
24. Reliable data on this is needed but lacking. One indication that fee-cutting by law-
yers to meet lay competition is going on to some extent is the evidence in In re Opinion No.
26,654 A.2d 1344 (N.J. 1995). At the time of this case, the mid-1990s, real estate brokers
in South Jersey were performing the legal services for most buyers and sellers of real prop-
erty but for few buyers or sellers in North Jersey. In South Jersey, where lawyers had ex-
tensive competition, their average charge to buyers was $650, to sellers $350. In North Jer-
sey, where the lawyers lacked competition, their average charge to buyers was $1,000, to
sellers $750. Id. at 1349.
25. Some state bar associations and some larger local bar associations have unauthor-
ized practice committees that issue occasional advisory opinions on unauthorized law prac-
tice problems. These opinions can be useful guides but have no binding legal effect.
In some states, state unauthorized practice committees, with limited enforcement pow-
ers on unauthorized law practice matters, also may issue nonbinding advisory opinions. See,
e.g., N.J. R. CT., R. GEN. ApPLICATION, 1.22-2(a). The New Jersey Committee is ap-
pointed by the New Jersey Supreme Court and consists of twenty-one lawyer members and
four lay members. Id. R. 1.22-1(a). In Oregon, the attorney general issues occasional pub-
lished opinions on the unauthorized practice of law.
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meanor inmost states,26 and violators also are subject to a variety of
civil sanctions, including injunction, contempt of court and inability
to recover fees for unauthorized practice services rendered. Law-
yers who violate unauthorized practice laws also violate their profes-
sional responsibility obligations.27 Much of unauthorized practice
law is highly ambiguous, uncertain, and often unclear as to who is
being prohibited from performing what kinds of legal services.
However, in every state there are spheres of relative clarity in the
law of unauthorized law practice. These include what services are
legal services, as distinct from services that only lawyers may per-
form; what legal services certain designated nonlawyer service
groups mayor may not provide and to whom; and what sanctions
violators of unauthorized practice laws may incur.
Within very broad limits there is consistency among the states
as to what are legal services, the kinds of services being regulated
by unauthorized practice laws. As noted above, these services con-
sist principally of preparing legal instruments, giving legal advice
and appearing in a representational capacity before an adjudicatory
tribunal. There may be great uncertainty as to which groups can le-
gally provide these services and under what circumstances, but there
is little uncertainty as to what services are legal services.
The objective or objectives of any particular law concerning
unauthorized law practice also are usually clear either from what law
makers say the law is seeking to achieve or from the obvious intent
of the law. Different legal restrictions or exemptions imposed by
unauthorized practice laws may have different objectives, but any
such restriction or exemption is likely to have one or both of these
goals: protecting consumers from incompetent or unethical legal
service providers;28 or assuring a market for legal services that will
26. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 9.990 (2001) (anyone, other than an active member of
the Oregon State Bar, who practices law or represents that he or she is qualified to practice
law, is subject to a fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment for a period not exceeding
six months, or both); WASH. REV. CODE § 2.48.180(3) (unlawful practice of law is a gross
misdemeanor and each subsequent violation a class C felony) & § 248.180(8) (Supp. 2003)
(the prosecuting attorney may also seek an injunction and a civil penalty of up to five thou-
sand dollars for each violation).
27. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (aiding the unauthorized practice
of law) and R. 8.4(a) (2002) (professional misconduct); OR. CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY, DR 1-102A(I) (professional misconduct), DR 3-101 (2002) (unlawful prac-
tice of law).
28. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. 2 (as approved by the
ABA is Aug. 2002); Dauphin County Bar Ass'n v. Mazzacaro, 351 A.2d 229, 232 (Pa.
HeinOnline -- 39 Willamette L. Rev. 808 2003
808 WILLAMEITE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:795
provide services of sufficient quality at a reasonable price. 29 An ob-
jective that some law makers may have in adopting an unauthorized
practice law, although an objective they are unlikely to publicly ad-
mit as their goal, is to benefit a particular group of present or aspir-
ing legal service providers merely because of the group's power and
influence or because of the law maker's affiliation with the group.
Although there are important elements of relative clarity in the
law of unauthorized law practice, there are also extensive ambigui-
ties and uncertainties in that law, serious deficiencies given the im-
portance of the legal service activities involved. Even defining the
practice of law with sufficient certainty to be useful in determining
what is the practice of law in particular situations has proven diffi-
cult. 30 The ambiguities in unauthorized practice law are so prevalent
1976); Or. State Bar v. Wright, 573 P.2d 283,286 (Or. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 785
P.2d 340 (1990); Or. State Bar v. Sec. Escrows, Inc., 377 P.2d 334, 338-39 (Or. 1962);
Bennion, Van Camp, Hagen & Ruhl v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., 635 P.2d 730, 733 (Wash.
1981).
29. See, e.g., In re Opinion No. 26, 654 A.2d 1344, 1346, 1359-60 (N.J. 1995).
30. A useful definition of the practice of law deserving of adoption in other states is
Washington Supreme Court General Rule 24a, succinctly defining the practice of law, with
certain exceptions and exclusions being listed in subsection (b) of the rule:
(a) General Definition: The practice of law is the application of legal principles
and judgment with regard to the circumstances or objectives of another entity or
person(s) which require the knowledge and skill of a person trained in the law.
This includes but is not limited to:
(1) Giving advice or counsel to others as to their legal rights or the legal
rights or responsibilities of others for fees or other consideration.
(2) Selection, drafting, or completion of legal documents or agreements
which affect the legal rights of an entity or person(s).
(3) Representation of another entity or person(s) in a court, or in a formal
administrative adjudicative proceeding or other formal dispute resolution
process or in an administrative adjudicative proceeding in which legal plead-
ings are filed or a record is established as the basis for judicial review.
(4) Negotiation of legal rights or responsibilities on behalf of another entity
or person(s).
WASH. CT. R. 24(a).
A somewhat similar definition to the Washington one has recently been proposed by an
ABA Task Force. See Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law, ABA
Ctr. for Profl Responsibility, Draft (Sept. 18, 2002). Also see Oregon State Bar Board of
Governors Policies, Rule 9.700A(2), concerning the duties of the State Bar's Unlawful Prac-
tice of Law Committee, stating in part:
The practice of law includes, but is not limited to, any of the following: (1) hold-
ing oneself out, in any manner, as an attorney or lawyer authorized to practice law
in the State of Oregon; (2) appearing, personally or otherwise, on behalf of an-
other in any judicial or administrative proceeding; (3) providing advice or service
to another on any matter involving the application of legal principles to rights, du-
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that in every state there are troublesome doubts in the law as to the
legal service performance rights of many occupational groups other
than lawyers, but also of lawyers' and law firms' rights in two very
important areas of their practice: multijurisdictional practice and
multidisciplinary practice. The usual unauthorized practice regula-
tory pattern is one common to most fields of law: some very broad
general rules and a set of sub-rules or binding interpretations ampli-
fying and qualifying the principles laid down in the general rules.
The problem is that most of the general rules are so broad that they
need clarification, and the clarification that has been provided has
been inadequate. Without clarification, some of the general rules
are too vague to have much meaning, and applying some of them
literally could have highly undesirable consequences.
For example, a common general rule in the law of unauthorized
practice is that only lawyers admitted to practice in a particular state
may practice law in that state. 31 But what does this rule mean?
Does it prohibit nonlawyers from providing any kind of legal ser-
vices to others under any circumstances? Does it prohibit bankers
from telling customers what the legal risks are of not paying loan
obligations, or social workers from informing their clients of the cli-
ents' welfare and social security rights, or a third-year law student
from preparing a residential lease for the student's parents? Another
general rule adopted in some states is that certain designated occupa-
tions, usually certain state-licensed occupations, may perform legal
services incidental to the usual nonlegal services provided by that
occupation.32 But precisely what services are incidental? For in-
ties, obligations or liabilities.
OR. STATE BAR BD. OF GOVERNORS POL'yS R. 9.700A(2) (2002).
On the difficulty of defining the practice of law, see N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, April 2000
Report, supra note 9, at 301-03.
31. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6125 (West Supp. 2002); N.Y. JUDICIARY
LAW § 478 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 9.160 & 9.320 (2001); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5(a) (the pre-2002 version that is currently in effect in most states)
(prohibiting lawyers from practicing law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regula-
tion of the legal profession in that jurisdiction). The 2002 revision of Model Rule 5.5 ex-
pands considerably lawyer multijurisdictional practice rights. See infra note 60.
32. See, e.g., Pope County Bar Ass'n, Inc. v. Suggs, 624 S.W.2d 828, 831-32 (Ark.
1981); Pulse v. N. Am. Land Title Co. of Mont., 707 P.2d 1105,1109-10 (Mont. 1985); In
re Bercu, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209,220 (N.Y. App. 1948), aff'd without opinion, 87 N.E.2d 451
(1949) (accountant engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when he gave legal advice on
a federal income tax question that was not incidental to bookkeeping, auditing or tax prepa-
ration work performed for the client). But cf. Or. State Bar v. John H. Miller & Co., 385
P.2d 181, 182 (Or. 1963) (responding to defendants' argument that the legal advice given
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stance, if made applicable to licensed real estate brokers, does it in-
clude preparation of each and every kind of legal document common
to residential real estate transactions and also to the closing of those
transactions? And does it apply to the brokers preparing documents
in complex commercial real estate transactions and closing those
kinds of transactions?
Still another very abstract rule with some adoption is that it is
the unauthorized practice of law for nonlawyers to advise others on
difficult or doubtful legal questions. 33 Analogous to the difficult or
doubtful legal question test is the one that prohibits nonlawyers from
providing legal services to others that require legal skill or knowl-
edge or more than ordinary business intelligence. 34 Then there is the
test, so vague as to be almost meaningless, that the practice of law is
what is commonly known as the practice of law. 35 Ambiguity is an
obvious and particularly troublesome feature of much unauthorized
practice law.
There are, of course, segments of unauthorized practice law in
every state that are sufficiently clear and precise as to leave little
doubt over the law's intended meaning. For example, in all states it
is clear that individuals, natural persons as distinct from corpora-
tions and other organizations, may perform legal services for them-
selves, so-called pro se representation, including self-representation
in court proceedings.36 Also, the federal government has intervened
customers by its insurance sales and estate planning business was merely incidental to that
business and hence not the unauthorized practice of law, the court stated: "To fall outside the
proscription of the statute [prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law] the legal element
must not only be incidental, it must be insubstantial. It cannot be said that one who plans
another person's estate employs the law only in an insubstantial way."); Or. State Bar v.
Sec. Escrows, Inc., 377 P.2d 334,339 (Or. 1962) (rejecting the incidental test).
33. See, e.g., Baron v. City of Los Angeles, 469 P.2d 353, 358 (Cal. 1970); Cardinal
v. Merrill Lynch Realty/Burnet, 433 N.W.2d 864, 868-69 (Minn. 1988).
34. See Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 214 N.E.2d 771, 774-75 (III.
1966) (applying this test in holding a real estate broker to be engaged in unauthorized law
practice when preparing real estate transaction documents for others).
35. See, e.g., Grievance Comm. of Bar of New Haven County v. Payne, 22 A.2d 623,
626 (Conn. 1941) (cited with approval in State Bar Ass'n v. Conn. Bank & Trust Co., 140
A.2d 863, 870 (Conn. 1958), and Taft v. Amsel, 180 A.2d 756, 757 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1962)).
36. On the right of pro se representation generally, see WOLFRAM, supra note I, at
803-06. For the right of pro se representation in Oregon, see OR. REV. STAT. §§ 9.160 &
9.320 (2001) and Oregon Peaceworks Green, PAC v. Secretary of State, 810 P.2d 836 (Or.
1991), on remand, 814 P.2d 190 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (holding nonattorney officer of an un-
incorporated political action committee not permitted to represent the committee in state
court litigation proceedings).
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in a few aspects of unauthorized practice law to permit nonlawyer
performance of legal services in some clearly ascertainable situa-
tions, including the right of designated nonlawyers to represent cli-
ents before certain federal administrative agencies. 37 Additional ex-
amples are the scattering of laws in most every state that clearly set
forth certain legal services that mayor in some circumstances may
not be performed by specified nonlawyer occupations. Many laws
pertaining to unauthorized law practice are occupation-specific,38 but
37. See. e.g., 31 C.P.R. § 10.3 (2001) (attorneys, certified public accountants and en-
rolled agents, and actuaries may practice before the U.S. Internal Revenue Service); 37
C.P.R. § 10.6 (2001) (qualifying attorneys and nonattorney agents may practice before the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office on patent matters). See also State ex rei. Juvenile Dep't
of Lane County v. Shuey, 850 P .2d 378 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that in proceedings for
an Indian child's custody, the federal government's Indian Child Custody Act preempts Ore-
gon statutory requirements that intervenors be represented by an attorney).
38. See. e.g.• ARIZ. CONST. art. 26, § 1 (authorizing licensed real estate brokers to
draft or fill out essential documents in real estate transactions when acting as brokers or
salespersons); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-70-120 (2001) (prohibiting practice of law by nonat-
torney collection agency representatives); OR. REV. STAT. § 9.166(2) (2001) (holding that
licensed real estate brokers in arranging real estate transactions are not engaged in the unau-
thorized practice of law); Id. § 9.280 (holding that persons who act as immigration consult-
ants for compensation, and who are not active members of the Oregon State Bar, are en-
gaged in the unauthorized practice of law); Id. § 52.060 (allowing nonlawyer to act as
attorney for others in justice court); S.C. APP. CT. R. 414 (authorizing limited certification
rights for certain law school clinical law teachers to provide legal services); WASH. CT. R.
12 (Admission to Practice) (authorizing lay closing officers to select, prepare and complete
certain legal documents incident to the closing of real estate and personal property transac-
tions); In re Opinion No. 26, 654 A.2d 1344 (N.J. 1995) (holding that after informed con-
sent by the clients, real estate brokers and title companies may prepare real estate convey-
ancing documents and close real estate transactions); In re Application of N.J. Soc'y of
Certified Pub. Accountants, 507 A.2d 711 (N.J. 1986) (holding that subject to certain re-
strictions, CPAs may prepare New Jersey inheritance tax returns); Linder v. Ins. Claims
Consultants, Inc., 560 S.E.2d 612 (S.C. 2002) (determining what kinds of legal services
may be performed by different kinds of insurance adjusters).
There have been some reported Oregon judicial opinions on unauthorized practice of
law by nonlawyers. Most of these cases involve nonlawyers selling legal documents and
giving advice on their use to their customers or drafting legal instruments for their custom-
ers. See. e.g.• In re Morin, 878 P.2d 393 (Or. 1994) (holding that nonlawyer paralegals
employed by an attorney selling living trusts were engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law when they gave legal advice to customers and selected legal documents to meet customer
needs; attorney disbarred); Or. State Bar v. Gilchrist, 538 P.2d 913 (Or. 1975) (holding
nonlawyers selling do-it-yourself kits were illegally practicing law when advising customers
of their legal rights and advising or assisting customers in filling out divorce kit forms. but
advertising and selling the kits was legally permissible); Or. State Bar v. John H. Miller &
Co., Inc., 385 P.2d 181, 184 (Or. 1963) (holding that estate planning and insurance sales
company and its president engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and were "enjoined
from preparing estate plans embodying legal analysis either as a separate service or as an
incident to carrying on the business of selling insurance"); Or. State Bar v. Sec. Escrows,
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the details vary from state to state. Many of the detailed occupation-
specific legal pronouncements as to what is and is not unauthorized
law practice appear in judicial opinions; but some appear in court
rules, statutes, and very occasionally in state constitutions.39
Some detailed laws as to the legal limits on lawyer multijuris-
dictional practice also appear in the laws of some states, frequently
in case law and court rules. Some of these are very restrictive,40
others more liberal as to the rights of out-of-state lawyers. 41 Quite
universally, out-of-state lawyers, with proper court approval, may
appear pro hac vice before the courts of a state where they are not
admitted. 42 A few states have adopted a position similar to that of
the Restatement43 and permit an out-of-state lawyer to provide such
client services in their state as client consultation, client advice, fact
investigation, and settlement negotiations if these services are prin-
cipally related to an out-of-state judicial or administrative proceeding
or out-of-state client,44 Also, the law in about one-fourth of the
Inc., 377 P.2d 334, 340 (1962) (holding that escrow companies and their nonlawyer employ-
ees were illegally engaged in the practice of law when exercising discretion in selecting and
preparing legal instruments for customers, but that "filling in of blanks [in a legal instru-
ment] under the direction of a customer upon a form or forms selected by the customer" was
legally permissible); Or. State Bar v. Smith, 942 P.2d 793 (Or. 1997) (holding that
nonlawyers operating a paralegal service that made legal forms available to customers were
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in advising customers of their legal rights and an
injunction prohibiting this conduct does not violate Oregon or U.S. Constitution free speech
and free expression rights). On unauthorized practice of law by real estate brokers in Ore-
gon, including discussion of Oregon Revised Statutes section 166.2, see Shane L. Goudey,
Comment, Too Many Hands in the Cookie Jar: The Unauthorized Practice of Law by Real
Estate Brokers, 75 OR. L. REV. 889, 917-24 (1996). On Oregon unauthorized practice of
law as to another occupation-specific group, see Therese M. Wandling, Note, Divorce Kits
and Unauthorized Practice, 55 OR. L. REV. 408 (1976).
39. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 38.
40. See, e.g., Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949
P .2d 1 (Cal. 1998). The California Legislature subsequently eased somewhat the effect of
this case by permitting attorneys admitted in other states, but not California, to represent
parties in arbitration proceedings in California. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1282.4.
41. See, e.g., MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.916 (West Supp. 2002) (prohibiting
practice of law by persons not regularly licensed and authorized to practice in Michigan but
adding: "This section does not apply to a person who is duly licensed and authorized to prac-
tice law in another state while temporarily in this state and engaged in a particular matter. ").
42. See, e.g., CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-16; N.Y. CT. ApP. R. § 520.11; OR. REV.
STAT. § 9.241(2) (2001). See also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5(c)(2)
(2002).
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 3 (1998).
44. See, e.g., MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.916 (West Supp. 2002-2003).
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states now expressly authorizes house counsel whose principal office
is in the state, although not licensed to practice law in the state, the
right to provide legal services to their employer.45 The house coun-
A comparable position to that of the Restatement has been approved by the ABA in its
2002 revision of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 5.5(b)(2)(ii) provides that a lawyer may act "with respect to a matter that
arises out of or is otherwise reasonably related to the lawyer's practice on behalf of a client
in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice." The commentary to Rule 5.5
states, "This conduct may involve negotiations with private parties, as well as negotiations
with government officers or employees, appearances in administrative or rule-making pro-
ceedings or before tribunals for which pro hac vice admissions are unavailable, and partici-
pation in alternative dispute-resolution proceedings." This Model Rule, of course, will be
effective only in states that adopt it.
A possible variant of liberalized multijurisdictionallaw practice is the easing of bar ad-
mission restrictions regionally by a reciprocal agreement among states in a region. This ap-
proach recently was adopted by Oregon, Washington, and Idaho. Each of these states now
will admit a lawyer to practice in their state without taking their state's bar examination if
the lawyer currently is admitted to practice in one of the other two states. The Oregon tri-
state reciprocity admission rule is found in Oregon Rules of Court, Rule 1505. It provides
in part:
(1) Lawyers who have taken and passed the Idaho and/or Washington bar
examinations, who are active members of either or both of those state bars as a re-
sult of the passage of those examinations, and who have actively, substantially and
continuously practiced law in one or both of these states for no less than three
years immediately preceding their application for admission under this rule may be
admitted to the practice of law in Oregon without having to take and pass the Ore-
gon bar examination, subject to the requirements of this rule.
OR. CT. R. 1505 (Admission of Attorneys in Oregon). The Oregon rule also imposes some
competence and moral fitness requirements on applicants. The Washington and Idaho rules
are similar to the Oregon rule.
45. See Needham, Permitting Lawyers. supra note 7, at 1356-58 (considering recent
changes in state laws concerning out-of-state house counsel and citing the rules or statutes in
fifteen states authorizing out-of-state house counsel to provide legal services to their em-
ployer). Oregon recently joined this list. See OR. CT. R. 1605 (Admission) (adopted effec-
tive Nov. 1,2001). On this rule, see also George A. Riemer, New Admission Rule, 62 Or.
ST. B. BULL. 23 (June 2002). The 2002 revision in the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 5.5 also authorizes such services by house counsel in states where the rule is
adopted. Revised Model Rule 5.5(d)(I) now provides:
(d) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or
suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services in this ju-
risd iction that:
(1) are provided to the lawyer's employer or its organizational affiliates and
are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission;
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5(d)(I) (2002).
Comment 16 to Rule 5.5 states that Rule 5.5(d)(I)
applies to in-house corporate lawyers, government lawyers and others who are
employed to render legal services to the employer. The lawyer's ability to repre-
sent the employer outside the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is licensed generally
serves the interests of the employer and does not create an unreasonable risk to the
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sel, however, must be licensed to practice law in another state, and
court appearances generally are not permitted. Although much of
the law as to the validity of multidisciplinary practice remains
murky, a few states have recently adopted laws directed at particular
models of multidisciplinary practice that have added considerable
clarity and certainty to some aspects of this controversial type of
practice. For example, the New York courts, by court rule, have
added a section to the Code of Professional Responsibility, applica-
ble to New York lawyers, that with certain provisos, permits con-
tinuing contractual relationships between law firms and nonlegal
professionals for providing clients with legal and nonlegal services.46
The new rule became effective on November 1, 2001. Another ex-
ample is that the courts in a small number of states have recently
adopted a new prov.ision in their professional conduct rules that
would permit lawyers and law firms to perform limited nonlegal
services ancillary to the practice of law. 47 Another clear aspect of
unauthorized practice law involving conduct of lawyers is that law-
yers, under the sanction of suspension from law practice, are prohib-
ited from providing legal services to others and may receive an addi-
tional sanction for doing so. 48
A highly important aspect of contemporary unauthorized prac-
tice law is that whether the law is relatively clear or is ambiguous,
since the 1970s there has been a marked decline in efforts to enforce
this law despite extensive and apparent noncompliance. Criminal
prosecutions for unauthorized law practice violations have been al-
most nonexistent,49 and in every state, civil actions against violators
client and others because the employer is well situated to assess the lawyer's quali-
fications and the quality of the lawyer's work.
46. See N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY § 1200.5-c(a). If certain conditions
are met, "a lawyer or law firm may enter into and maintain a contractual relationship with a
nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm for the purpose of offering to the
public, on a systematic and continuing basis, legal services performed by the lawyer or law
firm, as well as other nonlegal services."
47. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (2002) (particularly cmt. 9) (this
change was originally approved and recommended by the ABA in 1994.). States that have
adopted this rule are Pennsylvania, Maine, North Dakota, Indiana, and Massachusetts. See
Daly, supra note 9, at 246 n.116.
48. See, e.g., In re Devers, 974 P.2d 191 (Or. 1999) (attorney disbarred); In re Jones,
825 P.2d 1365 (Or. 1992) (attorney disbarred); State ex ret. Or. State Bar v. Lenske, 407
P.2d 250 (Or. 1965) (attorney held in criminal contempt).
49. Even in the 1970s and before, there were few reported criminal cases against those
alleged to be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Among such earlier cases were
Huber v. State, 216 S.E.2d 73 (Ga. 1975) (holding that a nonlawyer appearing on behalf of
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have been rare. 50 Lack of enforcement of unauthorized practice law
has not only encouraged noncompliance but has contributed to the
uncertainty in the law, as opinions from enforcement proceedings
before adjudicatory bodies are a major source of enhanced clarifica-
tion of the law.
c. Why the Deficiencies in the Law of Unauthorized Law Practice?
The law of unauthorized practice currently is seriously deficient
in that noncompliance is extensive, enforcement efforts are largely
lacking and major segments of the law are ambiguous and uncertain.
These deficiencies exist in the unauthorized practice law of every
state but with variation from state to state in the scope and severity
of the deficiencies. Who is legally authorized to practice law and
who is excluded from doing so are of great importance to the effec-
tiveness of any legal system; so why the current deficiencies? A
major reason is failure in recent years by the legal profession, espe-
cially bar associations, to more actively and aggressively push for.
either clarification or enforcement of unauthorized practice laws.
There was a period in the mid-twentieth century, up to the 1970s, in
which the American Bar Association (ABA) and many of the state
bar associations were very active and often successful in seeking and
achieving more explicit, comprehensive and vigorously enforced un-
authorized practice laws. 51 These efforts were directed not only
against nonlawyers providing legal services but also against lawyers
seeking to provide such services in states where they were not ad-
another before a justice of the peace court committed a misdemeanor); State v. Bander, 265
A.2d 671 (N.J. 1970) (holding that a real estate broker, in drawing legal documents in a real
estate transaction, did not violate a criminal statute, reversing a lower court conviction);
State ex rei. Or. State Bar v. Lenske, 407 P.2d 250 (Or. 1965) (holding that an attorney
practicing law while under suspension was in criminal contempt and fined $500, with im-
prisonment ordered if fine was not paid); and State v. Pledger, 127 S.E.2d 337 (N.C. 1962)
(holding that a nonlawyer preparing real estate documents for sales made by his employer
did not violate a criminal statute, reversing a lower court conviction).
50. Although there have been few legal proceedings, civil or criminal, brought against
unauthorized practice violators in any state, threats of such proceedings by prosecutors, bar
association committees and others have occurred occasionally and have had some effect in
deterring unauthorized practice activities. However, these threats and their consequences
usually are not made public.
5!. On the history of unauthorized practice regulation and enforcement in the United
States, see WOLFRAM, supra note I, at 824-26; ABA Comm'n on Nonlawyer Practice,
Nonlawyer Activity in Law-Related Situations 16-32 (1995); Barlow F. Christensen, The Un-
authorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Really Make Good Neighbors-or Even Good
Sense?, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 159,161-201 (1980).
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mitted to practice. 52 Client protection from incompetent, unethical
and disloyal legal service providers was commonly advanced as the
reason for the bar's intervention. 53 But self-interest was also im-
plicit in much of this bar intervention, a recognition that lawyers,
especially in-state lawyers, are major beneficiaries of unauthorized
practice laws, laws that expand and strengthen the bar's monopoly
over legal services.
But why has the organized bar, starting a quarter-century or so
ago, substantially cut back on its efforts both to expand and clarify
what legally constitutes unauthorized law practice and to achieve
greater compliance with that law? Efforts have not entirely ceased
but have been greatly curtailed. Opposing unauthorized law practice
no longer is a crusade, as it had been to some bar associations in the
past. Despite flagrant and persistent violations in most states, rela-
tively little effort has been made in recent years to enforce unauthor-
ized practice laws. 54 One explanation for this very marked curtail-
ment of enforcement effort is the increased popular acceptance of
the concept that a free and open market, with few restraints imposed
by government, is the preferred type of economy for providing
goods and services. Legally protected monopolies, including the
lawyers' monopoly, are anathema to this free and open market ide-
ology; and those seeking to protect such monopolies are seen by
many as acting against the public interest. 55 Protecting the lawyers'
monopoly has been particularly difficult to justify when the bar has
failed to provide hard evidence of actual injury to consumers or oth-
ers from encroachment into the legal services market by many of its
nonlawyer competitors. 56 .
Other factors that appear to have influenced the organized bar
52. See, e.g., In re Roel, 144 N.E.2d 24 (N.Y. 1957); State ex rei. Ayamo v. State
Bd. of Governors of Wash. State Bar Ass'n, 167 P.2d 674 (Wash. 1946).
53. See, e.g., Gardner v. Conway, 48 N.W.2d 788,795 (Minn. 1951) (plaintiffs were
members of a county bar association committee on the practice of law); W. Va. State Bar v.
Earley, 109 S.E.2d 420, 435 (W. Va. 1959).
54. On the decline in enforcement of unauthorized practice laws, see ABA Comm'n on
Nonlawyer Practice, supra note 51, at 23-32; Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery ofLegal Ser-
vices by Nonlawyers, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 209, 216-17 (1990).
55. See. e.g., Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 9, at 89; Fischel, supra note 13. at
955-58.
56. Christensen makes this point in his oft-cited article published some years ago. See
Christensen, supra note 51, at 210-12. Others have made the same point in arguing for the
law to permit more consumer choice in seeking legal services. See, e.g., WOLFRAM, supra
note 1. at 828-31.
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to de-emphasize the unauthorized practice issue are the increased
economic resources and political influence of the bar's major com-
petitors. As these competitors have become more numerous and
have increased their encroachment into the legal services market,
trying to dislodge them by judicial or legislative-type action becomes
a more difficult and financially expensive undertaking and, if at-
tempted, presents a risk of losing. 57
An additional factor that appears to have contributed to the or-
ganized bar reducing its anti-unauthorized practice efforts is in-
creased division within the legal profession over how broad unau-
thorized practice laws should be and whether or not certain groups
should be restricted by these laws. In particular, there has been a
growing division within the legal profession on what should be done
about current legal restrictions on both multijurisdictional law prac-
tice and multidisciplinary practice. When their memberships are se-
riously split on an issue, bar associations are reluctant to take action
on the issue. Both multijurisdictional and multidisciplinary practice
have increasingly caused divisions within the bar as more lawyers
have become engaged in and profited from these kinds of practices.
However, many other lawyers consider their practices threatened by
the multijurisdictional and multidisciplinary practitioners. Such
acute divisions deter aggressive action by bar associations to either
enforce or seek to revise the laws involved.
Another significant reason for current deficiencies in unauthor-
ized practice law, especially the extensive ambiguity in much of that
law, is a lack of action to reform or clarify the law of unauthorized
practice by lawyers' competitors, against whom this law is princi-
pally directed. Lawyers' competitors have been remarkably quies-
cent on the issue, given what is at stake for them. They have de-
fended when legal proceedings have been brought against them
charging violations of unauthorized practice laws, but have done lit-
tle else in recent years to make unauthorized practice laws more in
accord with their interests. They have not publicly declared the rea-
sons for this hands-off position, but, given what they have been do-
57. The legal fees and other litigation expenses for a bar association or law firm to
bring an unauthorized practice enforcement case against a major nonlawyer competitor can
readily run into six figures, as these cases are likely to be vigorously defended, appeals are
probable and defense by the bar's opponents is frequently intensified by financial and amicus
brief support from their trade associations. Pro bono representation is a possible option but
a bitterly contested major case may require more time than law firms are willing to give pro
bono, or pro bono volunteers may not be the best qualified counsel.
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ing and the responses they have been receiving, the explanation
seems obvious.
The reasoning of the lawyers' competitors seems to as follows:
We are moving into the legal services market and getting much of
what we want without engaging in costly and chancy efforts to liber-
alize the law in our favor, so why try to force legal change? Why
gamble on legal setbacks? Lawyers are doing little through the law
to block our encroachment into the legal services market, consumers
of legal services are showing little interest in the unauthorized prac-
tice issue, and courts and other government agencies seem unlikely
to modify unauthorized practice laws on their own initiative-so, for
the present we will not try to force change in the law. Moreover, as
over time we become even more established in the legal services
market, it may become impossible to attract the support needed to
displace us from that market. An established and perpetuated status
quo is very much in our favor. Whether lawyers' competitors will
continue this quiescent approach to the unauthorized law practice is-
sue remains to be seen. They may ultimately be forced to take a
much more active role or eventually conclude that legal change in
their favor is so assured that they will aggressively seek such
change.
D. Is a More Active Era Emerging in the Reform and Enforcement of
Laws on Unauthorized Law Practice?
The prolonged and relatively quiescent period in reforming and
enforcing unauthorized practice law may be coming to an end. The
market for legal services is too important for so much of the law as
to who may participate in that market to remain indefinitely so am-
biguous, uncertain and unenforced. All major social issues go
through cycles of issue-attention.58 The down-phase of attention to
unauthorized practice law has been unusually protracted for such an
important issue, but there are signs that this down-phase may be
ending. Efforts to achieve change are coming mostly from within
the legal profession, especially the bar associations, the traditional
source for new and more intensified attempts to set effective legal
limits on who may legally engage in delivery of legal services.
58. See Anthony Downs, The Issue-Attention Cycle and the Political Economy of Im-
proving Our Environment, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL 9
(Joe S. Bain & Warren F. IIchman eds., 1972). See also B. Guy Peters & Brian W. Hog-
wood, In Search of the Issue-Attention Cycle, 47 1. POL. 238 (1985).
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However, these recent change efforts by the legal profession have
been largely limited to multijurisdictional practice and multidiscipli-
nary practice.
What triggered these efforts by the bar to more actively deal
with the unauthorized law practice problems of multijurisdictional
practice and multidisciplinary practice? What attracted the neces-
sary attention to generate serious demands for legal change from in-
fluential segments of the profession? Rapid escalation in issue-
attention on any important issue commonly is sparked by a single
event. And this event may be one whose occurrence was difficult to
predict much in advance and, if predictable, whose explosive effect
in intensifying broader concerns in many quarters was not expected.
Two quite separate events were the instigating occurrences that gen-
erated extensive concern within the bar as to multijurisdictional
practice and multidisciplinary practice. One of these events was the
Birbrower v. Superior Court case, a 1998 California Supreme Court
opinion that, in its holding and dictum, drastically restricted the le-
gal rights of out-of-state lawyers to engage in multijurisdictional
practice in California, with severe sanctions possible for violations. 59
The shock effect of Birbrower was acute and widespread. It under-
scored the risks to multijurisdictional practice and that lax enforce-
ment of restrictions on this phase of law practice may be ending.
Lawyers in all states are vividly reminded of their vulnerability
when they engage in multijurisdictional practice, as most state unau-
thorized practice laws could quite conceivably be given exclusionary
interpretations similar to those that Birbrower gave to California's
laws. The response to Birbrower has been a major move to clarify
and modify multijurisdictional laws, led by the ABA. 6O The post-
59. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon, & Frank v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 12-13
(Cal. 1998). The sanction imposed in this case was no fees to the out-of-state lawyers for
the legal services they provided in California. [d.
60. At its annual meeting in 2002, the ABA revised Rule 5.5 of its Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct to permit much more extensive multijurisdictional practice by lawyers.
Revised Model Rule 5.5(c) provides as follows:
(c) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or
suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a tem-
porary basis in this jurisdiction that:
(1) are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in
this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter;
(2) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a
tribunal in this or another jurisdiction, if the lawyer, or a person the lawyer
is assisting, is authorized by law or order to appear in such proceeding or
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Birbrower reaction also has been a contributing factor to some states
modifying their laws to permit house counsel based in the state, but
not admitted there, to provide legal services to the house counsel's
employer. 61
What triggered intensified concern by the bar with multidisci-
plinary practice were proposals by an ABA Commission, the Com-
mission on Multidisciplinary Practice. The Commission was ap-
pointed in 1998 by Philip Anderson, then-President of the ABA,
with little apparent demand by the Association's membership for
consideration of or action on the multidisciplinary practice issue. 62
The Commission made an intensive study of the multidisciplinary
practice issue, held a number of hearings, published a background
study on multidisciplinary practice and issued two reports, one in
1999 and one in 2000, each with recommendations. 63 The Commis-
sion proposed that the legal restrictions on multidisciplinary practice
be eased considerably and that, with substantial precautionary limits,
most forms of multidisciplinary practice legally be permitted, includ-
ing, apparently, a fully integrated form very favorable to accounting
firms and other nonlawyer organizations. 64 The reports and recom-
reasonably expects to be so authorized;
(3) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, media-
tion, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another ju-
risdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's
practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice and are
not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or
(4) are not within paragraphs (c)(2) or (c)(3) and arise out of or are reasona-
bly related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is
admitted to practice.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5(c) (2002). This rule will not be legally binding
in any state until adopted by the law-making authorities of that state.
The pre-2002 Rule 5.5 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct is substantially the
same as the Model Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule (DR) 3-101. Pre-
sumably, the Code states will be giving serious consideration to amending DR 3-101 to con-
form to ABA Model Rule 5.5.
61. On state law modifications favorable to house counsel, see supra note 45 and ac-
companying text.
62. On Mr. Anderson's motivations for appointing the Commission and his reactions to
its recommendation ultimately being rejected by the ABA, see Anderson, supra note 9, at
473-74.
63. See ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, supra note 9.
64. The Commission's 1999 recommendations are much more extensive than those it
made in 2000. The reason for the more limited recommendations seemingly was the hope
that this would enhance the prospects for their adoption by the House of Delegates. Both the
1999 and 2000 recommendations propose that they be implemented by amending the ABA
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mendations created extensive commentary and controversy within
the legal profession and ultimately, at its 2000 annual meeting, the
ABA's House of Delegates rejected its Commission's recommenda-
tions, by a three-to-one voting margin, and dismissed the Commis-
sion. 6s The controversy over multidisciplinary practice generated by
the ABA Commission's recommendations also spread to state and
larger local bar associations, to the point that many of these associa-
tions took a position on the multidisciplinary practice issue, with
some favoring legal validation of one or more forms of multidisci-
plinary practice that are now prohibited. 66
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The Commission's 2000 recommendations, ABA
Comm'n, May 2000 Report. supra note 9, at 1, are as follows:
1. Lawyers should be permitted to share fees and join with nonlawyer profession-
als in a practice that delivers both legal and nonlegal professional services [Multid-
isciplinary Practice], provided that the lawyers have the control and authority nec-
essary to assure lawyer independence in the rendering of legal services.
"Nonlawyer professionals" means members of recognized professions or other
disciplines that are governed by ethical standards.
2. This Recommendation must be implemented in a manner that protects the public
and preserves the core values of the legal profession, including competence, inde-
pendence of professional judgment, protection of confidential client information,
loyalty to the client through the avoidance of conflicts of interest, and pro bono
publico obligations.
3. To protect the public interest, regulatory authorities should enforce existing
rules and adopt such additional enforcement procedures as are needed to imple-
ment the principles identified in this recommendation.
4. This recommendation does not alter the prohibition on nonlawyers delivering
legal services and the obligations of all lawyers to observe the rules of professional
conduct.
5. Nor does it authorize passive investment in a Multidisciplinary Practice.
65. See John Gibeaut, 'It's a Done Deal, • House of Delegates Vote Crushes Chances
for Multidisciplinary Practice, 86 A.B.A. 1. 92 (Sept. 2000).
Influencing the ABA House of Delegates' vote against the Commission's recommenda-
tions and reflecting many of the opposition's arguments was the lengthy study and analysis of
multidisciplinary practice by a New York State Bar Association Committee. See N.Y. State
Bar Ass'n. April 2000 Report. supra note 9.
66. See Robert K. Christensen, Comment, At the Helm ofthe Multidisciplinary Practice
Issue After the ABA's Recommendation: States Finding Solutions by Taking Stock in Euro-
pean Harmonization to Preserve Their Sovereignty in Regulating the Legal Profession. 2001
BYU L. REV. 375, 380-82 (2001) (discussing state and local bar association responses to the
multidisciplinary practice issue). The action of the Connecticut Bar Association on the mul-
tidisciplinary practice issue may be fairly typical: appointment of a Study Committee on
Multidisciplinary Practice, extended examination of the problem by the Committee, a de-
tailed Committee report recommending further study and monitoring developments else-
where, and eventual disbanding of the committee due to lack of interest and concern. See
Conn. Bar Ass'n, Study Comm. on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report (May 2000). The
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So far, however, the renewed interest in multidisciplinary prac-
tice has produced almost no change in the law as to what aspects of
multidisciplinary practice are or are not legally permissible. More-
over, the renewed interest in multidisciplinary practice has declined;
the issue-attention cycle has moved downward. This decline is at-
tributable in part to the Enron collapse, with its negative conse-
quences for one of the Big Five accounting firms, Arthur Andersen,
and to the subsequent disclosures of improper and illegal behavior
by other accountants and consultants. Enron and its after-effects
seem to have postponed, at least for the near-term, major efforts to
appreciably ease the legal restrictions on multidisciplinary practice. 67
As a result of accountants' actions in Enron's operations and similar
matters, questions have arisen as to whether accounting firms should
legally be permitted to perform diverse kinds of services for their
clients when doing so creates loyalty and conflict-of-interest prob-
lems that can be very damaging to clients. Legal services obviously
are one kind of service that, when provided by an accounting firm or
any other kind of multidisciplinary service provider, can pose these
kinds of risks. Recently, new restrictions have been imposed by
Congress on accounting firms,68 and more are possible. The na-
tional mood currently is unreceptive to expanded multidisciplinary
practice by firms owned or controlled by nonlawyers or the legaliza-
tion of these practices by such firms. How long this mood will con-
tinue remains to be seen.
Despite the cooling-off effect of Enron and similar incidents on
efforts to remove many of the legal restrictions on multidisciplinary
practice, some momentum remains to reform and enforce other as-
pects of unauthorized practice law. Support for reducing many
states' legal restraints on multijurisdictional practice by lawyers re-
mains strong, and it seems fairly certain that a number of states will
soon ease their restrictions on this kind of law practice. More states
Oregon State Bar has considered the multidisciplinary practice issue but taken no action;
multidisciplinary practice is now a dead issue as far as the State Bar is concerned.
67. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 9, at 45.
68. In mid-2000, Congress passed the Corporate Fraud Accountability Act of 2000
(Sarbanes-Oxley), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2000). This long and detailed stat-
ute imposes new restrictions on accountants, including restrictions on an accounting firm
performing auditing and some consulting services for the same client. See id. at § 201.
Among other provisions, it imposes new obligations on lawyers for corporations to report
evidence of securities law violations, increases criminal penalties for securities fraud, in-
creases corporate financial disclosure obligations and prohibits most corporate loans to senior
corporate executives. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 116 Stat. 745.
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also are likely soon to legally authorize house counsel based in a
state to provide legal services to their employer, although the house
counsel are not licensed to practice in that state. New entrants into
the legal services market, especially new entrants lacking much eco-
nomic or political power, will probably be increasingly vulnerable to
bar-sponsored enforcement proceedings being brought against them
charging them with unauthorized practice of law.
The remainder of this Article considers in some detail the
power of state courts over unauthorized law practice and the possi-
ble implications this has for future law enforcement and law reform
in this field of law. State courts have been and will continue to be
of major importance in imposing and enforcing legal restraints on
unauthorized practice of law and, in most states, will likely continue
to be the ultimate determinants of the legal scope and effectiveness
of these restraints.
II. THE SCOPE OF STATE COURT LEGAL POWER OVER UNAUTHORIZED
LAW PRACTICE
The source of legal power69 of each branch of state government
over any matters, unauthorized law practice matters included, is the
state's constitution. What power is allocated to each branch often
depends on interpretations of the amorphous constitutional concept
of separation of powers and how that concept is amplified and inter-
preted in each state. Unlike the Federal Constitution, most state
constitutions have express separation of powers provisions, usually
phrased in very general terms. 70 Ten states have no explicit separa-
69. Power, as the term is used in this Article, means the legal authority to do certain
acts. For other meanings of power, see M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS 13 (2d ed. 1998).
70. On separation of powers provisions in state constitutions, see Jim Rossi, Institu-
tional Design and the Lingering Legacy ofAntifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the
States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1190-1216 (1999). In its generality, the Oregon Constitu-
tion separation of powers section is typical of that of many states. Oregon Constitution, arti-
cle III, section 1 provides:
Section 1. Separation of powers. The powers of the Government shall be divided
into three seperate [sic] departments, the Legislative, the Executive, including the
administrative, and the Judicial; and no person charged with official duties under
one of these departments, shall exercise any of the functions of another, except as
in this Constitution expressly provided.
See also the very general power allocation to each department by the Oregon Constitution:
art. IV, § 17 (legislative assembly); art. V, § 1 (governor); art. VII, § 1 (the courts). And
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tion of powers clause in their constitution, but separation of powers
is inferred from the constitutional power allocation to each branch,
analogous to the approach taken in interpreting the United States
Constitution.71 Most state constitutions are much more detailed than
the United States Constitution, and some states supplement separa-
tion of powers as the source of judicial power by adding more ex-
plicit provisions.72
Courts often rely on the concept of inherent power in determin-
ing the scope of their authority. 73 In very general terms, this power
includes the authority to carry out the courts' essential operations
and to fulfill their responsibilities. More particularly, this includes·
the power over court governance, implementation of adjudication,
logistical support of the courts and enforcement procedures. 74 Some
see Joseph D. Robertson & John H. Buehler, The Separation ofPowers and the Regulation
of the Practice ofLaw in Oregon, 13 WILLAMETIE L. REV. 273 (1977).
71. States without an explicit separation of powers clause in their constitutions are
Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wash-
ington and Wisconsin. For a discussion of separation of powers provisions in state constitu-
tions, see Rossi, supra note 70, at 1190-91.
72. See, e.g., FLA. CaNST. art. V, § 15 ("The supreme court shall have exclusive ju-
risdiction to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law and the discipline of
persons admitted. "); N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3 ("The supreme court shall have author-
ity ... , unless otherwise provided by law, to promulgate rules and regulations for the ad-
mission to practice, conduct, disciplining, and disbarment of attorneys at law. ").
73. On inherent judicial power see FELIX F. STUMPF, NATIONAL JUDICIAL COLLEGE,
INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS, SWORD AND SHIELD OF THE JUDICIARY (1994);
WOLFRAM, supra note I, at 22-33 (1986); Thomas M. Alpert, The Inherent Power of the
Courts to Regulate the Practice of Law: An Historical Analysis, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 525
(1983); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural
Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735 (2001); Robertson & Buehler, supra note 70, at 274-79;
Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation-The Role ofthe Inherent-Powers
Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITILE ROCK L. REV. 1 (1989-90) [hereinafter Wolfram, Lawyer
Turf].
74. This is Stumpfs categorization and under each of these categories he lists many
types of situations, with at least some case law authority, over which courts have been held
to have inherent power. STUMPF, supra note 73, at iii-vi. For example, under court gov-
ernance he lists power to punish for contempt, power to make rules, power to govern and
regulate the bar and the practice of law (e.g., regulating admission, practice, discipline and
compensation of counsel to represent indigents) and power to manage and regulate the court
system (e.g., the conduct of the judiciary). Id. at iii-vi.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a recent opinion, lists three areas ofjudicial inherent
power: internal court operations, regulation of the bench and bar, and ensuring that the
courts function efficiently and effectively to provide fair administration of justice. City of
Sun Prairie v. Davis, 595 N.W.2d 635, 640-41 (Wis. 1999). In its discussion of inherent
power, the Wisconsin court adds that the courts have exclusive authority over some kinds of
inherent power and share other kinds with the executive or legislative branch. Id. at 640.
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judicial opinions expressly declare that the inherent power concept is
constitutionally based and use the concept to interpret and delimit
the state constitution's separation of powers requirement as applied
to the courts.75 In many other judicial opinions in which the courts
rely on the inherent power concept in their reasoning, no reference
to the concept's constitutional source is made, apparently assuming
that it is constitutionally based.76 But whatever the conceptual rea-
soning applied, it is generally recognized that state courts have the
last word in interpreting their state's constitution.77 The latest inter-
pretation of a state constitution's meaning by the state's supreme
court is considered binding law. Some may consciously violate what
the court's interpretation requires. Others may try to have Jhe inter-
pretation reversed by subsequent court action, but the final interpre-
tive authority of the state supreme court as to the meaning of the
state's constitution is rarely challenged. 78 But can courts exert their
But exclusive judicial inherent power may allow another branch to exercise that power as a
matter of comity. Id.
75. See, e.g., Konrad v. Jefferson Parish Council, 520 So.2d 393, 397 (La. 1988); In
re Burson, 909 S.W.2d 768,772-73 (Tenn. 1995); Bennion, Van Camp, Hagen & Ruhl v.
Kassler Escrow, Inc., 635 P.2d 730, 735-36 (Wash. 1981). For a discussion of Oregon case
law on inherent judicial power in unauthorized practice cases, see Robertson & Buehler, su-
pra note 70, at 283-85. For Oregon cases considering the inherent judicial power concept in
deciding nonunauthorized practice cases, see, e.g., Dennehy v. City of Gresham, 841 P .2d
633, 635 (1992) (holding that the Oregon Tax Court does not have the inherent equitable
power to award attorneys' fees); State ex rel. Acocella v. Allen, 604 P.2d 391, 394-95
(1979) (holding that the Oregon statute on appointment of the public defender did not uncon-
stitutionally infringe on the inherent power of the judiciary to compel attorneys to represent
indigent criminal defendants).
76. See, e.g., Eckles v. Atlanta Tech. Group, Inc., 485 S.E.2d 22, 25 (Ga. 1997);
Reed v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 789 S.W.2d 19,20 (Mo. 1990).
In our system of constitutionally allocated governmental powers, it seems illogical that
courts could have power from a nonconstitutional source. One commentator, however, ap-
parently considers that there is an alternative nonconstitutional source for inherent judicial
power-that courts have such power from their existence as courts. See STUMPF, supra note
73, at 8-9.
77. An Oregon opinion has succinctly stated this position. See Lyons v. Pearce, 676
P.2d 905,909 (1984) ("The interpretation of constitutional provisions is ajudicial, not a leg-
islative, function. The legislature cannot overrule a judicial interpretation of the constitution
or amend the constitution by adopting a statute. ").
78. Judicial supremacy in interpreting the Federal Constitution was an important issue
with influential opponents and supporters in the early days of the republic and was seriously
challenged on occasion by some presidents thereafter. On the evolution of the judicial su-
premacy of the United States Supreme Court as to interpretation of the Federal Constitution,
see EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 59-84 (1938); CHRISTOPHER
WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW (rev. ed. 1994). See also ROBERT
SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESIDENCY 14-22 (1971) (considering earlier
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power only through litigated case determinations? Or can they also
do so through legislative-type rules issued independently of any liti-
gated matter? Quite universally courts, in some states only the
state's highest court, have the power to adopt court rules on at least
some aspects of court administration, practice and procedure.79 Ju-
dicial rule-making is expressly authorized by the state constitutions
in a majority of states and, in others, is an incident of other judicial
presidential support for coordinate review-officials of each branch interpreting the Federal
Constitution as they understand it-but concluding that judicial supremacy in constitutional
interpretation is preferable, even though judicial interpretation of the Constitution may not
always be adhered to by those in another branch).
Some contemporary commentators have proposed that serious consideration be given to
substantially limiting the Supreme Court's constitutional interpretive powers. See, e.g.,
David Chang, A Critique ofJudicial Supremacy, 36 VILL. L. REV. 281, 395-99 (1991) (sug-
gesting that congressional supremacy or other constitutional interpretive regimes may be
preferable to judicial supremacy); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS 2 (1980) (summarizing the theme of his book as follows: "[A]lthough
judicial review is incompatible with a fundamental precept of American democracy-
majority rule-the court must exercise this power in order to protect individual rights, which
are not adequately represented in the political processes. When judicial review is unneces-
sary for the effective preservation of our constitutional scheme, however, the Court should
decline to exercise its authority. By so abstaining, the Justices both reduce the discord be-
tween judicial review and majoritarian democracy and enhance their ability to render en-
forceable constitutional decisions when their participation is critically needed. "); Paul C.
Weiler, Rights and Judges in a Democracy: A New Canadian Version, 18 U. MICH. 1. L.
REFORM 51, 84-85 (1984) (suggesting that permitting congressional override of Supreme
Court decisions on basic constitutional rights, analogous to the legislative override permitted
by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, might be preferable to constitutional su-
premacy of the Supreme Court that presently exists). For a recommendation that final au-
thority of the Supreme Court over constitutional interpretation be totally eliminated, see
THOMAS J. HIGGINS, JUDICIAL REVIEW UNMASKED 261-68 (1981).
79. On courts' rule-making power, see A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Leg-
islative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U.
PA. L. REV. 1 (1958); Robert 1. Lynn, Judicial Rule-Making and the Separation of Powers
in New Hampshire: The Need for Constitutional Reform, N.H. B.1. 44 (March 2001);
DONNA J. PUGH ET AL., JUDICIAL RULEMAKING, A COMPENDIUM (1984); STUMPF, supra
note 73, at 17-20; Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniform-
ity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999 (1989). On
preferred forms of judicial rule-making, see 1 ABA, STANDARDS OF JuDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATION § 1.30 (1990); JACK
B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES (1977).
Some judicial court rules are very long and detailed-for example, the rules prescribing
professional responsibility standards for lawyers. In nearly all states these professional re-
sponsibility rules, usually with some changes, are either the ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct or the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. California has never
adopted the ABA Model Rules or Model Code but has borrowed from both in its Rules of
Professional Conduct.
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constitutional powers. 80 The legislative-type rule-making power of
state courts is separate and distinct from the courts' power to declare
authoritative rules as binding legal principles when deciding cases in
litigation before them. 81 Unauthorized law practice is one of the
many matters expressly dealt with by court rules in a number of
states. 82
Although state courts obviously have the power to determine
what is and is not the unauthorized practice of law, to what extent
do they share this power with the other two branches of govern-
ment? There are several possible answers to this question with au-
thoritative support in prevailing law in at least some states. One is
that the courts' power over unauthorized practice of law matters is
exclusive. Only the courts have law-making power in this field of
law. This position has been adopted in a few states. 83 Another, the
80. On the source of judicial rule-making power in each state, see Lynn, supra note 79,
at 49-50.
81. The states vary as to the extent of the courts' legislative-type rule-making power
and on what matters this rule-making power is exclusive or shared with the other branches of
government. For variations among the states on the extent of state courts' rule-making au-
thority, see Lynn, supra note 79, at 49-50; PUGH, supra note 79 (containing a state-by-state
summary of state court rule-making law).
82. State courts have dealt with many aspects of unauthorized practice in court rules.
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2002) (prohibiting lawyers from en-
gaging in certain practices that constitute the unauthorized practice of law and from assisting
others in engaging in the unauthorized practice of law). This Model Rule, except for a re-
cent revision that liberalizes permissible multijurisdictional law practice, has been adopted as
a rule of court in most states, and adoption of the revision by many states is expected soon.
See also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-101 (2002) (in effect in Oregon as
OR. R. PRo DR 3-101). Among other examples of state court rules of relevance to unauthor-
ized law practice are those permitting legal services to be provided by the following provid-
ers (legal services that if not authorized would be unauthorized practice): foreign lawyers,
see, e.g., CONN. SUP. CT. R. §§ 2-17-2-21; out-of-state lawyers in litigated matters before
the courts if admitted pro hac vice, e.g., id. § 2-16; nonlawyer closing officers in real estate
transactions, WASH. CT. R. 12 (Admission to Practice). A few state courts by court rule
have defined the practice of law for unauthorized practice purposes. See, e.g., id. R. 24
(defining the practice of law and listing some exceptions to what otherwise would be the un-
authorized practice of law) (for this Washington Rule see supra note 30.).
A court, of course, may prefer to act by adjudicated decision rather than court rule. An
example of this is the refusal by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in In re Unauthorized
Practice ofLaw Rules Proposed by the South Carolina Bar, 422 S.E.2d 123 (S.C. 1992). In
its rejection of the rules proposed by a special subcommittee of the South Carolina Bar, the
court said: "We are convinced that the better course is to decide what is and what is not the
unauthorized practice of law in the context of an actual case or controversy." Id. at 124.
83. See. e.g., In re Creasy, 12 P.3d 214, 216 (Ariz. 2000); May V. Coleman, 945
S.W.2d 426,428 (Ky. 1997); In re Opinion No. 26,654 A.2d 1344, 1345 (N.J. 1995) (But
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majority position, is that the power is concurrent, shared by all three
governmental branches, but that the courts have ultimate power.
The courts' determinations prevail if their position differs from that
of one of the other branches. 84 A third position, and one that also
has authoritative support in a few states, is that power over unau-
thorized practice of law matters is concurrent but that the courts'
power is subordinate to that of either of the other two branches when
their positions differ. 85 However, the position of some states on the
the legislature may criminalize certain conduct that constitutes the unauthorized practice of
law. Id. at 1354.).
84. See, e.g., Eckles v. Atlanta Tech. Group, 485 S.E.2d 22,25-26 (Ga. 1997); Reed
v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 789 S.W.2d 19,20 (Mo. 1990); Unauthorized Prac-
tice ofLaw Rules, 422 S.E.2d at 124; In re Burson, 909 S.W.2d 768,773-74 (Tenn. 1995).
Professor Wolfram refers to the superior power of the courts over the practice of law,
including unauthorized law practice, as a negative inherent power because, under this power,
the courts can invalidate any and all statutes or administrative agency regulations permitting
or restricting the practice of law and can do so irrespective of the merits of the statutes or
regulations. He considers judicial resort to inherent judicial power in invalidating laws
adopted by the other branches to be undesirable in most instances. On Wolfram's analysis
and evaluation of negative inherent power, see WOLFRAM, supra note I, at 834-35; Wolf-
ram, Lawyer Turf, supra note 73.
85. Case law authority is very skimpy on the proposition that state courts have concur-
rent authority on unauthorized law practice with one or the other branches but that ultimate
authority is in one of the other branches. For cases that consider the courts' power to be
subordinate, see, e.g., Florida Bar Y. Moses, 380 So.2d 412,417 (Fla. 1980) ("The legisla-
ture has constitutional authorization to oust the Court's responsibility to protect the public in
administrative proceedings under article V, section 1 of the Florida Constitution, and when it
does so any 'practice of law' conduct becomes, in effect, authorized representation. "). But
in Moses the relevant statute was construed, under the facts of the case, as not ousting the
court's authority. Id. at 418. Since this case, the courts' authority in Florida over unauthor-
ized law practice has apparently not been seriously challenged in any litigated case. See also
State Bar v. Cramer, 249 N.W.2d 1,7 (Mich. 1976) (holding that the legislature has ulti-
mate authority to determine what is the unauthorized practice of law, although because the
legislature has not done so, determination is left to the judiciary); State Bar of Mich. v. Gal-
loway, 335 N.W.2d 475, 479-80 (Mich. App. 1983) (holding that ultimate authority is in the
legislature as to whether nonlawyers may represent parties before an administrative agency);
Ranta v. McCamey, 391 N.W.2d 161, 165 (N.D. 1986) (relying on state constitutional lan-
guage that the courts have authority over law practice "unless otherwise provided by law").
But the state legislature has by statute vested the North Dakota Supreme Court with the
power to make "all necessary rules for the restraint of persons unlawfully engaging in the
practice of the law in this state." N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-02-07 (1991).
New York probably should be classified as a concurrent but legislative-dominant power
state on judicial power over unauthorized law practice as its courts long have accepted and
applied statutes controlling law practice, including unauthorized practice, without challeng-
ing the legislature's authority to enact these statutes. See, e.g., People v. Alfani, 125 N.E.
671,672-74 (N.Y. 1919); N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n v. Dacey, 283 N.Y.S.2d 984, 989-
90 (App. Div. 1967), rey'd on other grounds, 234 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 1967); People v. Jaku-
bowitz, 710 N.Y.S.2d 844, 845 (Sup. Ct. 2000).
HeinOnline -- 39 Willamette L. Rev. 829 2003
2003] UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW 829
power allocation issue is unclear, either because there are no re-
ported opinions on the matter86 or because reported opinions on the
issue are vague or inconclusive. 87 In justifying their declared posi-
There also is some recent indication by the California Supreme Court that California
follows the legislative dominance position as to what constitutes the practice of law. See
Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon, & Frank v. ESQ Bus. Serv., 949 P.2d 1,9 (Cal. 1998).
But cf Merco Constr. Eng'rs v. Mun. Court, 581 P.2d 636, 640-41 (Cal. 1978).
86. For example, South Dakota and Wyoming. And compare Utah State Bar v. Sum-
merhayes & Hayden, 905 P.2d 867, 871 n.l (Utah 1995), in which the issue was brought
before the court but the court refused to address it.
87. For example, Texas. See Unauthorized Practice Comm. v. Cortez, 692 S.W.2d
47,50-51 (Tex. 1985); Brown v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., 742 S.W.2d 34, 41
(Tex. App. 1987); Grievance Comm. v. Dean, 190 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Civ. App.
1945).
There are no Oregon judicial opinions in unauthorized practice of law cases that clearly
set forth the scope of judicial power over the unauthorized practice of law relative to the
other two governmental branches. However, there is comprehensive enough language in
Oregon judicial opinions on some other matters indicating that the Oregon judicial power
position on unauthorized practice of law may be as follows: concurrent power in both the
courts and the legislature but ultimate power is in the legislature unless a legislative enact-
ment unreasonably encroaches on judicial functions. See, e.g., State ex ret. Acocella v. Al-
len, 604 P.2d 391, 395 (Or. 1979) (overruling the trial court's refusal to appoint counsel
other than the public defender to represent indigent defendants in a criminal case despite a
statute authorizing such an appointment, a statute that the trial judge asserts is unconstitu-
tional). In support of its decision, the Oregon Supreme Court opinion states, after citing ear-
lier Oregon cases:
These cases establish that the legislature may regulate the legal profession and the
practice of law, provided that a statute does not unduly burden or unduly interfere
with the judiciary in the exercise of its judicial functions. Viewing ORS
151.280(7) against that standard, we do not see how the occasional unavailability
of the State Public Defender to represent indigent defendants on appeal would im-
pair the court's ability to carry out any judicial function.
Id. The Acocella opinion, of course, adds further uncertainties: what are judicial functions,
and what will impair the courts' ability to carry out such functions?
On the uncertainty in Oregon case law regarding the scope of judicial power over the
unauthorized practice of law, also see the following unauthorized practice opinions in which
the Oregon Supreme Court refused to answer the question of whether the legislature has the
exclusive constitutional power to define the practice of law, even though this can be impor-
tant in determining whether unauthorized practice of law has occurred: Oregon State Bar v.
Wright, 573 P.2d 283, 290 (Or. 1977) (stating that there is no need in this case to decide the
issue, as the defendant admitted to engaging in conduct constituting the practice of law); and
Oregon State Bar v. Security Escrows, Inc., 377 P.2d 334, 336 (Or. 1962). The court ad-
mitted that whether either the court or the legislature has the exclusive power to decide the
issue is a question "of constitutional importance, involving as it does, the frontier between
the separated powers of government under our state constitution." Id. One reason the court
gave for not answering the question is that the question had not been briefed and argued with
the thoroughness it deserves. Id.
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tion on court power over unauthorized law practice matters, what-
ever that position is, state courts typically have relied on brief refer-
ences to state constitutional texts as to judicial authority88 or have re-
ferred in general terms to their inherent powers. 89 They rarely, if
ever, have asserted policy arguments to further justify whatever
power position they adopt.
III. JUSTIFYING POSITIONS TAKEN ON THE SCOPE OF STATE COURT
LEGAL POWER OVER UNAUTHORIZED LAW PRACTICE: DIVERSITY IN
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
As the previous section shows, there are substantial differences
among the states as to the scope of judicial power, including the
scope of that power over the unauthorized practice of law. The
primary source of judicial power in each state is the state constitu-
tion. But the constitutional text on judicial power in nearly every
state constitution is phrased in such vague and general terms as to
require extensive interpretation to make it meaningful in applica-
tion-interpretation that leaves most interpreters with considerable
discretion in determining what the constitution provides. 90 Legal
problem solving usually involves selection from among alternative
possible solutions; but, given the ambiguity of most constitutional
texts and the diversity and complexity of matters to which constitu-
tional texts may apply, legal problem solving that requires constitu-
tional interpretation can be an exceptionally difficult and challenging
task. Courts and commentators, when interpreting constitutions,
On the frequent unwillingness of state supreme courts to provide adequate or meaning-
ful analysis of state supreme court principles, see James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse
ofState Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 781-84 (1992).
88. See, e.g., In re Creasy, 12 P.3d 214, 216 (Ariz. 2000); In re Opinion No. 26, 654
A.2d 1344, 1345 (N.J. 1995).
89. See, e.g., Eckles v. Atlanta Tech. Group, 485 S.E.2d 22, 25 (Ga. 1997); In re
Burson, 909 S.W.2d 768, 773-74 (Tenn. 1995).
90. The need for interpretive discretion on the scope of judicial power is considerably
reduced in a few state constitutions due to more specific textual language on judicial power
in these constitutions. See, e.g., Ky. CONST. § 116 (the Kentucky Supreme Court "shall, by
rule, govern admission to the bar. "). However, interpretation was required as to whether
this language extended to unauthorized practice of law. In May v. Coleman, 945 S.W.2d
426, 428 (Ky. 1997), it was held that section 116 gives the Kentucky Supreme Court sole
authority to designate who is authorized to practice law. See also ARIZ. CONST. art. 26, § 1
(preempting judicial power in one important aspect of unauthorized practice by expressly
permitting licensed real estate brokers to draft or fill out and complete certain legal docu-
ments in land transactions).
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usually advance supportive reasons for their interpretive conclu-
sions.91 But commentators, especially academic commentators, in
justifying their interpretive conclusions, commonly present a greater
range of supportive reasons than do others. Commentators occa-
sionally have also recommended state constitutional amendments,
including amendments concerning the allocation of judicial power;92
but usually they consider existing constitutional texts, if properly in-
terpreted, sufficient to permit solutions that the commentators con-
sider necessary.
Although there often are sharp differences among those inter-
preting a state constitution as to the constitution's meaning, many
interpreters generally adhere to the same general procedure in their
interpretive efforts, whether the scope of judicial power over unau-
thorized practice or any other constitutional problem is being con-
sidered. The procedure consists of three possible steps commonly
taken in sequence, although some interpreters consider them concur-
rently. Step one is to concentrate on the constitutional text. If the
interpreter believes the text is sufficiently clear and unequivocal in
providing an answer to the question at hand, the text is often relied
on without the necessity of moving to the next step. If the text does
not adequately answer the question, the interpreter moves to step
two. Step two considers the intent of the persons who drafted or
adopted the constitution as to what the constitutional text means.
This intent may be ascertained from different sources, including
statements by the drafters or adopters as to what they intended or
from the usual meaning of key constitutional terms at the time the
constitution was adopted. If a sequential approach is taken, step
three is resorted to if the first two steps do not provide a sufficiently
satisfactory and convincing answer to the constitution's meaning.93
91. "Commentators," as the term is used here, includes judges when they are not act-
ing ex officio in making interpretive observations. Among other commentators are academic
scholars, both lawyers and nonlawyers; practicing lawyers when representing clients; and
representatives of other interest groups when commenting on constitutional meaning.
92. For state constitution amendment proposals by commentators, see, e.g., Levin &
Amsterdam, supra note 79, at 42; Lynn, supra note 79, at 58-61.
93. On the unavoidable necessity of step three in interpreting the Federal Constitution,
see Martin H. Redish & Karen L. Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and Judicial Review:
The Role ofTextual Analysis, 62 N. Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1987).
Given the generally broad language of the [Federal] Constitution's text, a review-
ing court has substantial power to incorporate into the interpretive process many
normative judgments concerning social policy and political theory. Such a result
is simply unavoidable, once we recognize both that the provisions of a written
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Under step three, the interpreter determines what the relevant consti-
tutional language or concept under consideration means based on
one or more underlying policies that the interpreter concludes the
constitution should be furthering. 94 A policy, as the term is used
here, is a course of action to achieve one or more important social
goals or values. Some goals or values may be very vague. For ex-
ample, justice, social equality, or avoiding tyranny may be too
vague on their own to be sufficient guides to constitutional meaning.
Policies can be very helpful guides to constitutional interpretation,
but many are so broad and general that when being considered as
aids to constitutional interpretation, considerable discretion may still
remain in the interpreter as to whether and how the policies apply to
any particular constitutional problem being considered. A policy
may eventually become a rule of law but more often is a reason ad-
vanced to help justify a rule of law or interpretation of a rule of law.
A variety of policies have been advanced by interpreters of
state constitutional provisions allocating judicial power. Some of
these interpretive efforts are focused on judicial power over unau-
thorized practice of law. Some are focused on judicial power over
other matters, matters often with enough similarity to unauthorized
practice of law that the policies advocated may be applicable as well
to judicial power over unauthorized practice of law. State court
constitution must be broadly phrased to allow for unforeseen developments and
situations, and that the only governmental body truly suited to the exercise of the
interpretive power is the largely independent judicial branch. Unless the very ex-
istence of a written constitution is to be rendered totally meaningless, however, the
language of its provisions must be assumed to retain at least some degree of ascer-
tainable meaning.
Id. at 51.
94. Some multi-step interpreters omit policy considerations. See, e.g., Priest v.
Pearce, 840 P.2d 65, 67 (Or. 1992). Interpreting the bail rights section of the Oregon Con-
stitution, the court sets forth this three-step interpretive procedure: "There are three levels
on which that constitutional provision [art. I, § 14] must be addressed: Its specific wording,
the case law surrounding it, and the historical circumstances that led to its creation." Id.
For an analysis of Priest and other Oregon cases on constitutional interpretation that is
critical of the Oregon courts for failure to follow a consistent pattern or overriding theory in
constitutional interpretation, see Jack L. Landau, Hurrah for Revolution: A Critical Assess-
ment of State Constitutional Interpretation, 79 OR. L. REV. 793 (2000). And compare Lan-
dau's analysis of the Oregon Supreme Court's statutory interpretation methodology in Jack
L. Landau, Some Observations About Statutory Construction in Oregon, 32 WILLAMEITE L.
REV. 1 (1996). Jack Landau is an Oregon Court of Appeals judge. On Priest, see also
Christopher A. Bishop, Comment, Revisiting Article I, Section 5 ofthe Oregon Constitution:
The Application of Priest v. Pearce and an Evaluation of the Oregon School Tax Credit, 38
WILLAMEITE L. REV. 427 (2002).
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judges seldom invoke policy arguments in their judicial opinions
when deciding cases brought before them that raise issues of consti-
tutional allocation of judicial power. On constitutional judicial
power issues, they usually make their decisions at the first step in
the interpretive procedural process, seldom at the second or third.
In determining the scope of their judicial power and whether their
power is superior to that of the other two governmental branches,
state courts frequently rely on the inherent power concept. 95 But this
is a step-one interpretive approach. The courts are interpreting the
constitutions' texts on separation of powers or other allocations of
judicial functions to include inherent power as an essential element
of the textual concept.96 Commentators, much more commonly than
courts, resort to step three policy arguments in support of their
analyses of how state constitutions allocate judicial power.
There are many different and often inconsistent policies that
can be advanced in aid of constitutional interpretations of power al-
locations among the three branches of government. Some of the
policies are generally favorable to greater judicial power, some to
lesser judicial power, and as to others, it depends on how the policy
is defined or how it should best be implemented in a particular situa-
tion. The range and variety of policies are shown by the following
sample of possible policies. The relevance of each policy to the al-
location of judicial power over the unauthorized practice of law is
considered after the policy is set forth. 97
* Assure each branch sufficient power over its essential func-
95. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
97. The listing in the text is merely a sampling. Many other policies are possible as
aids to constitutional interpretations. Further examples are these and are added indications
of the broad range of policy possibilities: prefer contemporary moral values; avoid judicial
activism; fairly balance competing public and private interests; prefer a constitutional inter-
pretation consistent with that adopted in a nearby state if this will benefit the interstate activi-
ties of citizens in your state; and avoid making constitutional decisions if the problems can
be resolved legally on nonconstitutional grounds.
The literature on constitutional interpretation is extensive, much of it advocating a par-
ticular approach or policy choice and most of it concentrating on the Federal Constitution.
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (1996); WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTER-
PRETATION (2d ed. 1995); ANTONIN SCALIA ET AL., A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997); G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS, ch. 6 (1998); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES (1985); HARRY H.
WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION (1990); Gardner, supra note 87.
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tions to enable it to perform successfully its primary purpose. 98
Whether this policy helps justify greater judicial power over
unauthorized practice of law than what is constitutionally allotted to
either of the other governmental branches depends on how broad a
meaning the interpreter gives to the concepts of essential court func-
tions and primary court purpose. At best, dominant judicial power
over unauthorized practice of law would seem to be at the outer lim-
its of what these concepts authorize. Dominant judicial power over
the unauthorized practice of law is more obviously justified if lim-
ited to determining who may represent parties in matters before the
courts, as such representation directly relates to the essential court
98. This policy, although phrased in different ways, has often been adopted by both
courts and commentators. See, e.g., Ramstead v. Morgan, 347 P.2d 594, 601 (Or. 1959)
("Unquestionably, the legislature may act authoritatively with respect to some matters which
affect the judicial process.... The limits of legislative authority are reached, however,
when legislative action unduly burdens or unduly interferes with the judicial department in
the exercise of its judicial functions. "); Rooney v. Kulongoski, 902 P.2d 1143, 1151 (Or.
1995) (citing Ramstead v. Morgan, 347 P.2d 594 (Or. 1959), with approval and adding:
"That inquiry [whether one department has unduly burdened another department] corre-
sponds primarily to the underlying principle that separation of powers seeks to avoid the po-
tential for coercive influence between governmental departments. "); Anderson County Quar-
terly Court v. Judges of the 28th Judicial Cir., 579 S.W.2d 875, 881 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978)
(The courts "must have and do have the inherent powers necessary to insure the adequate
fulfillment of their judicial functions. "); In re Salary of the Judicial Director, 552 P.2d 163,
173 (Wash. 1976) (holding judicial power to secure judicial funding has been held permissi-
ble "if the funds sought to be controlled are reasonably necessary for the holding of court,
the efficient administration of justice, or the fulfillment of its [the court's] constitutional du-
ties"; the required necessity held not proven in that case); Stephen E. Kalish, The Nebraska
Supreme Court, the Practice ofLaw and the Regulation ofAttorneys, 59 NEB. L. REV. 555,
599 (1980) (holding that the legislature should have ultimate control except when it is
"strictly necessary to assure the proper functioning of the judicial process"); Harold J.
Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation ofPowers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV. 1253,
1255 (1988) (describing as follows the functionalist approach favored by many commentators
in interpreting the federal Constitution: The functionalists "generally ask whether the exer-
cise of the contested function by one branch impermissibly intrudes into the core function or
domain of the other branch. In other words, as long as the power assumed by one branch
does not threaten to disturb the basic allocation of powers intended by the framers, the action
should be sustained. ").
Charles Wolfram has also expressed support for the functionalist policy approach to
state court judicial power under some circumstances, including legislative enactments setting
a low statutory cap on fees the state will pay a lawyer who represents an indigent defendant
in a death-penalty case. See Wolfram, Lawyer Turf, supra note 73, at 10 ("At some point a
court is warranted in saying that the degree of impairment [of adequate representation] has
reached the point of unconstitutional encroachment on the essential functioning of a court.
At that point the legislative act is unconstitutional. "). Wolfram does not believe, however,
that this ultimate judicial power over the legislature should be extended to the unauthorized
practice of law. See WOLFRAM, supra note 1, at 27-31.
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function of hearing and deciding litigated matters brought before the
courts.
* Avoid power allocation to anyone branch that would result in
that branch being overly dominant relative to the other two
branches. 99
This is a policy that, in the abstract, has merit; but as an aid to
how power over unauthorized practice of law should be allocated
among the three governmental branches, it provides little help. The
overall power balance among the three branches is little affected by
which branch has ultimate or even exclusive power over unauthor-
ized practice of law; so, the policy is largely irrelevant to this power
allocation issue. The avoiding-power-imbalance admonition of the
policy may, however, be relevant to power allocation of unauthor-
ized practice of law if it is perceived that there is a trend underway
of courts acquiring excessive power and that restricting judicial
power over unauthorized practice of law would help reverse this
trend.
* Prefer the branch most subject to control by the citizenry and
most accountable to the citizenry. 100
This policy, if followed, generally disfavors the courts when
they disagree with either of the other two branches on an unauthor-
99. LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 159 (2d ed. 1953) ("A constitution is
primarily an instrument to distribute political power; and so far as it is, it is hard to escape
the necessity of some tribunal with authority to declare when the prescribed distribution has
been disturbed. Otherwise those who hold the purse will be likely in the end to dominate
and absorb everything else, except as astute executives may from time to time check them by
capturing and holding popular favor. ").
100. In discussing control of law practice, Wolfram has stated that separation of powers
"is a doctrine that should give primacy to the most truly democratic organ of government:
the legislature." See Wolfram, Lawyer Turf, supra note 73, at 14. But he recognizes that
separation of powers is not a doctrine about "air-tight" separation. "It is a doctrine, more or
less, of balance and accommodation." Id.
Even some judges have expressed concern over the lack of judicial accountability. See,
for example, a New Hampshire judge's observations, Lynn, supra note 79, at 61 (expressing
concern over the lack of judicial accountability in judicial rule-making, and concluding that
"in a free and democratic society the ultimate responsibility for law-making-whether the
laws be substantive, procedural, evidentiary, or whatever-must rest with the legislature").
Also see comments by a federal judge as to court rule-making power, WEINSTEIN, supra
note 79, at 78 ("So long as the legislature is not seeking to destroy a court's power to act
effectively, statutes should supersede [court] rules. Unlike the courts, the executive and leg-
islature are subject to popular will; this will, however blurred by the filter of representative
democracy, should not be circumscribed unnecessarily. The Anglo-American experience
with rule-making demonstrates no need for the court to have unfettered control over proce-
dure through rule-making. ").
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ized practice matter or any other matter. Influence of the citizenry
on the courts is especially weak in those states whose judges are not
elected or are elected for exceptionally long terms compared to the
terms of legislators or top executive officials. However, justifica-
tion for political influence on the courts by the citizenry is substan-
tially limited by the widely approved and adhered-to principle of ju-
dicial independence-a type of restriction not applicable to the other
two branches. A serious problem with the control-by-the-citizenry
policy is that, if not cautiously and restrictively applied, it so weak-
ens the courts as to destroy the concept of co-equal branches of gov-
ernment-a basic feature of American constitutional law. It can also
lead to undue influence of business and other special interest groups
on judicial selection and retention, with consequent undue influence
on judicial decision making. This can result, for example, from
special interest group contributions to judges' election campaigns
and to funding of issue advertising at campaign time directed at par-
ticular judicial candidates. These are increasingly prevalent and
troublesome influences on the makeup and ultimately the decisions
of many state courts. 101 A significant variant of the above pro-
citizenry policy, one that legislators and government executive offi-
cials are prone to follow, is to prefer whatever interpretive decision
the electorate already has given some indication should be preferred
in resolving the particular problem under consideration. Even courts
on occasion may be sensitive to views of the electorate, as is implied
by the oft-repeated observation that the United States Supreme Court
follows the election returns. But how power over unauthorized
practice of law should be allocated among governmental branches
seldom can be shown to have been a concern of the electorate in any
election, federal or state.
* Prefer the branch with the greatest law-making competence
on the matter under consideration. 102
101. On these influences, see, e.g., Symposium, Judicial Election Campaigns, 41
JUDGES' 1. 5 (Sum. 2002); Symposium, National Summit on Improving Judicial Selection,
34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1353 (2001); Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76
N.Y.D. L. REV. 973 (2001); David Barnhizer, "On the Make": Campaign Funding and the
Corrupting afthe American Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 361 (2001); Paul J. DeMuniz,
infra note 104.
102. See ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT, THE DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
AND ITS PRESENT-DAY SIGNIFICANCE 107 (1953) ("The modern trend throughout the coun-
try has been to give the courts the power to regulate their own procedure and administration
and then to hold them responsible for results. The reasons for this trend are obvious. Rules
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Ultimate power in the courts over unauthorized practice of law
is favored by this approach, as judges (from their experience on the
bench) and as lawyers (before becoming judges) have a better under-
standing than most legislators and government executives of the es-
sential skills and ethical commitments needed to properly practice
law and of the adverse consequences that can result from the unau-
thorized practice of law.
* If there are justifiable reasons for doing so, adopt an inter-
pretation other than the one the interpreter personally prefers.
Interpreters of state constitutions quite often adopt interpreta-
tions other than what the interpreter personally considers preferable.
This can occur whether the interpretive question relates to judicial
power over unauthorized practice of law or to any other constitu-
tional interpretive question. The preferred interpretation, however
meritorious, is passed over in favor of one more consistent with the
interpreter's role or that will be instrumental in achieving other
high-priority objectives of the interpreter. Lawyers .representing
private clients and lawyers and other officials representing govern-
ment agencies almost always adopt interpretations they consider
most likely to further the interests of the clients or government
agencies they represent. These interpretations are adopted even
though the interpreters personally prefer some other interpretation.
The role of advocates usually requires that they subordinate personal
views that are inconsistent with their principals' interests. A judge,
however, when interpreting ambiguous provisions of a state constitu-
tion, is usually expected to adopt the interpretation that the judge
personally believes is the preferable one. But there are recognized
exceptions to this that may be considered justifiable. The judge may
conclude that the personally preferred interpretation may have such
undesirable consequences that it should not be adopted. The inter-
pretation, for example, may cause serious interbranch conflict that
Qf court are made by experts who are familiar with the specific problems to be solved and
the various ways of solving them.").
Deborah Rhode, in her numerous publications on unauthorized practice of law, has had
surprisingly little to say about how power over that phase of the practice should be allocated
among the three governmental branches. She has, however, indicated her opposition to
granting such power to the courts. See Rhode, supra note 54, at 233 ("Since judges gener-
ally lack the time, expertise, and objectivity to provide appropriate oversight of lay practitio-
ners, little would be gained by placing their regulation under nominal court supervision. ").
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should be avoided,103 be unenforceable, be inconsistent with prevail-
ing legal authority, or be certain to be reversed by a higher court.
Also, there may be justifiable tactical policies for subordinating a
judge's personal preference. When an interpretive decision is before
a multi-judge court, one or more of the judges may compromise on
an interpretive decision in the hope that this will help them prevail
on other contested issues. In addition, subordinating a preference
may be essential to giving the impression of a unified court when a
split decision would threaten the court's reputation or influence.
Accountability to the electorate can create still another possible ex-
ception to the expectation that a state court judge will adhere to per-
sonal interpretive preference. If the judge is up for re-election and
intends to run again, it may be considered quite justifiable for the
judge to accede to the views of the electorate in making a constitu-
tional interpretation, irrespective of the judge's personal interpretive
preferences. 104
103. But there have been occasions when courts concluded that such an important prin-
ciple was at stake that they were willing to make a constitutional interpretive decision in de-
fiance of another governmental branch, knowing that this would result in a protracted and
controversial showdown with the other branch. These confrontations usually have involved
failure by the legislature to provide what the courts considered adequate funding for essential
court operations or for legal representation of indigents charged with crimes. See, e.g.,
State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith & Fromme, 747 P.2d 816,821-23 (Kan. 1987) (commenting
on state court controversy with the state legislative and executive branches over funding of
court-appointed counsel to represent indigents charged with crimes); Howard B. Glaser,
Wachtler v. Cuomo: The Limits of Inherent Powers, 78 JUDICATURE 12 (July-Aug. 1994)
(discussing a conflict between the Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals and the
Governor over state court funding); Comment, Constitutional Crisis in Pennsylvania: Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court v. Pennsylvania General Assembly, 102 DICK. L. REV. 201 (1997)
(discussing controversy between the court and legislature over judicial funding).
104. Justice DeMuniz of the Oregon Supreme Court recently has cautioned, however,
that the valued principle of judicial independence is threatened if judges compromise their
fidelity to the rule of law and accede to partisan political pressures, pressures that are often
prevalent at election time in states where judges are elected by popular vote. See Paul 1.
DeMuniz, Politicizing State Judicial Elections: A Threat to Judicial Independence, 38 WIL-
LAMETTE L. REV. 367, 387 (2002).
Judges certainly must be accountable to the citizens, both professionally and in
their personal lives. Informed criticism of court rulings, or of the professional or
personal conduct of judges, should play an important role in maintaining judicial
accountability. However, attacking courts and judges-not because they are
wrong on the law or the facts of a case, but because the decision is considered
wrong simply as a matter of political judgment-maligns one of the basic tenets of
judicial independence-intellectual honesty and dedication to enforcement of the
rule of law regardless of popular sentiment. Dedication to the rule of law requires
judges to rise above the political moment in making judicial decisions.
[d.
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Academic commentators are different from the other kinds of
interpreters. When interpreting state constitutional provisions, aca-
demic commentators are rarely, if ever, faced with the same inhibit-
ing factors that may cause other interpreters to adopt interpretations
inconsistent with their personal preferences. Academic commenta-
tors are not representing clients or government employers and are
free of the tactical and accountability influences that judges may
face. Their job is careful and critical analysis that results in adopt-
ing an interpretation that they personally prefer. The suspicion
sometimes arises that some academic commentators adopt interpreta-
tions that are so extreme, even ridiculous, that the interpreters are
trying to attract attention, to make an academic splash, and that it
cannot really be believed that this is their personal preference. For-
tunately, such cases are rare.
It is obvious that each step in the interpretive process usually
requires the exercise of considerable discretion on the part of the in-
terpreter. Relevant textual language is almost always somewhat am-
biguous and the interpreter must decide when and if the text is suffi-
ciently clear to be binding without considering the next step. Resort
to the intent of the drafters and adopters of the constitution usually
also leaves a wide range of choice in the interpreter, including which
drafter's or adopter's views should be considered, the meaning of
the statements attributed to them, and when are the views of the
drafters or adopters sufficiently unconvincing that the interpreter
should move on to step three. The drafters and adopters of the Fed-
eral Constitution, usually referred to as the Framers, often are given
almost religious reverence by interpreters and their views are com-
monly given exhaustive attention in determining the meaning of the
Federal Constitution. The drafters and adopters of state constitu-
tions rarely are given the same consideration and respect when state
constitutions are being interpreted. The third step in the interpretive
process also requires a great deal of discretionary choice by the in-
terpreter-choice as to which of the many possible policies to rely
on and, when that choice is made, often determining how to define
or shape the policy or policies chosen to best resolve the interpretive
problem being considered.
In making interpretive decisions on constitutional issues, inter-
preters frequently consider the opinions of others who have previ-
ously dealt with the same or a similar interpretive problem. These
almost invariably include any relevant prior judicial opinions. The
opinions of commentators also may be considered; and scholars, in
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making constitutional interpretations, almost always consider the
opinions of other commentators, especially other scholars. In reach-
ing interpretive decisions, courts also are aided by briefs and argu-
ments of counsel and by amicus briefs in some cases. Also, a judge
sitting on a multi-judge panel when deciding a case is frequently in-
fluenced and sometimes persuaded by the views of fellow judges on
the same decision-making panel. 105 However, both courts and coun-
sel in litigated matters involving constitutional meaning commonly
limit their exercise of interpretive discretion to little more than selec-
tion from among prior judicial decisions considering the same or
similar interpretive problems.
The above discussion raises some intriguing questions. When
state constitutional text provisions are ambiguous as to what power
the state's courts have over unauthorized practice of law, and such
ambiguity is very pervasive, why are some constitutional interpreta-
tions of judicial power adopted by the courts in some states but not
by the courts in other states? And why have the courts in a substan-
tial minority of states not decided whether their judicial power over
unauthorized practice of law issues is superior or subordinate to that
of other governmental branches? Answering these questions is be-
yond the intended coverage of this Article, but the questions deserve
more attention than constitutional law scholars have given them.
Many causative factors that vary among the states are possible rea-
sons for the interpretive differences among state courts on their con-
stitutional power over unauthorized practice of law. Variables that
may be relevant are these: the particular textual language on separa-
tion of powers, if any, in each state's constitution; the prevalence of
the unauthorized practice of law in each state; the prevalence and in-
tensity of opposition to unauthorized practice of law within each
state; the influence of the organized bar on the state's judges; the
vulnerability of each state's courts to pressures from the other
branches of state government and from the electorate; the extent to
which relations of each state's courts with the other branches of
government have been cooperative and noncontentious; and the po-
tential for amendment of each state's constitution on any aspect of
105. Judge Edwards of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit refers
to this process of influence and possible persuasion as judicial collegiality when engaged in
seriously, attentively and respectfully by the judges. He obviously believes that all appellate
courts should strive to achieve this kind of collegiality in their decision making. On Ed-
wards' perception of judicial collegiality, see Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision
Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1358-62 (1998).
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unauthorized practice of law. Acquiring reliable answers to the
above-mentioned constitutional questions will require careful study,
including some difficult-to-implement empirical studies. Complicat-
ing any such study is the fact that, historically, many of the causa-
tive factors in each state have fluctuated.
IV. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LEGAL REGULATION OF
UNAUTHORIZED LAW PRACTICE AND THE ROLE OF STATE COURTS IN
THAT REGULATION
The trend of nonlawyers being increasingly active as providers
of legal services seems certain to continue. Continued expansion in
the variety and volume of legal service activities by lawyers in juris-
dictions where the lawyers are not admitted to practice also seems
certain. The market for legal services is so big, so profitable, and
legal restrictions on unauthorized law practice so seldom enforced
that participation in that market is attractive to many legal service
providers despite the apparent illegality of their legal services work.
There has been, of course, renewed interest recently in both enforc-
ing and reforming unauthorized practice laws. But the resulting ef-
forts have been so narrowly and selectively focused and have gener-
ated such limited support and success as to have had little effect
overall in reducing the volume of law practice that is legally unau-
thorized. Eventually, however, possibly in the next decade, much
more comprehensive and intensive change efforts seem inevitable.
The continued violations of laws as important as those regulating
who may provide legal services, and the ambiguity in important as-
pects of those laws, cannot continue indefinitely without far more
extensive law enforcement or law reform efforts. The bar or a large
segment of the bar may become concerned enough over the growing
legal services activities of its competitors that they will make the fi-
nancial and political investment needed in an all-out battle with
competitors. If the bar does not initiate a major move against its
competitors, one or more of the big nonlawyer occupations active in
providing legal services may attempt to change the basic legal un-
derpinnings of unauthorized practice law. They may believe this is
necessary if they are to expand their legal service activities even
more extensively. Additionally, they may conclude that the time has
arrived for them to seek legal validation of their established position
in the legal services market; that they are so entrenched in that mar-
ket that government law-making bodies are now certain to support
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changes in the law that will fully and clearly approve their current
legal services activities. What precise event or events will trigger
these major efforts to attain comprehensive change in the enforce-
ment or reform of unauthorized practice laws are not predictable this
far in advance but sooner or later will occur.
Any consideration of prospects for future change in the law of
unauthorized law practice, either in restrictions that the law imposes
or in its enforcement, should be fully cognizant of the crucial role of
state courts. In a majority of states, state courts have the ultimate
and superior constitutional power to make unauthorized practice
law, to determine who mayor may not legally provide legal ser-
vices. If the legislature or executive officials disagree with the
courts' determinations, the courts' positions legally prevail. In addi-
tion, in all states, the most conclusive and decisive step in enforcing
unauthorized practice laws is litigation before the state's courts.
This is a process, once started, that the courts control and that re-
sults not only in legally resolving the rights of the parties before the
courts but also often in authoritatively amplifying or clarifying the
law's meaning.
In most states, the courts have superior and dominant power
over the other two branches on unauthorized law practice matters;
and there are other states, those in which this power issue is unde-
cided, that later may join the majority. As it seems quite possible
that in many situations state courts will take a more expansive view
of what constitutes unauthorized practice than will the other two
branches, the majority position on judicial power over unauthorized
practice is generally unfavorable to those interest groups whose pre-
sent or planned legal service activities violate unauthorized practice
laws. Some interest groups and some commentators look with dis-
favor on the majority position because it allocates ultimate power to
the governmental branch least accountable to the citizenry. 106 But is
it possible, in a democratic governmental system such as the one that
prevails in the United States, to legally block state courts from ac-
quiring or exercising such superior and dominant power over unau-
thorized law practice? The answer, of course, is that it is possible.
However, none of the possibilities for doing so holds much promise
of being adopted. One possibility is to amend the state's constitution
so that it clearly and precisely removes that power and, on unauthor-
106. See, e.g.. supra note 100; Rhode, supra note 54.
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ized practice matters, makes state court power subordinate to the
power of one or both of the other governmental branches. Even
though state constitutions are easier to amend than the Federal Con-
stitution, state constitutional amendment can be a long and arduous
process, usually with little chance of success, especially when it per-
tains to an issue of such limited popular understanding or interest as
judicial power over unauthorized law practice. Another possibility
is expanded federal government takeover of unauthorized law prac-
tice regulation, relying, for example, on the Commerce Clause to
justify this takeover. The federal government long has exerted lim-
ited control over who mayor may not practice law, and far more ex-
tensive federal control presumably could be justified under the pre-
emptive authority of the Federal Constitution. However, it could be
very difficult to attract the requisite political support for such a radi-
cal extension of federal power.
A further possible means of achieving legal subordination of
state court power over unauthorized law practice to that of the other
governmental branches is for state courts to clearly and unequivo-
cally interpret their state's constitution as so requiring. In most
states this would necessitate a sharp reversal of the courts' current
position, as the prevailing position is that the courts, under the
state's constitution, have dominant power over unauthorized practice
matters. Moreover, the courts in these states have shown little or no
inclination to give up this dominant power. As for states that have
not yet clearly declared whether or not their courts' power over un-
authorized law practice is dominant, there may be some prospect of
prevailing on them to take a subordinate rather than dominant judi-
cial power interpretative stance. However, arguments in favor of
judicial dominance over unauthorized law practice are so appealing
to judges that the odds are that, when pressed to make an unequivo-
cal decision, these courts will go with the majority of state courts
and hold that judicial power over unauthorized law practice is domi-
nant under their state's constitution. State court dominance over un-
authorized law practice probably will continue in most states for the
indefInite future, and it is quite likely that additional states will join
the majority.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The market for legal services in every state is substantially in-
fluenced by the scope of laws on unauthorized law practice and how
HeinOnline -- 39 Willamette L. Rev. 844 2003
844 WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:795
vigorously those laws are enforced. Most affected are consumers of
legal services and the various professions and occupations that cur-
rently provide legal services or that have aspirations for becoming
legal service providers. Lawyers admitted to practice in any partic-
ular state are the principal beneficiaries of unauthorized practice re-
strictions because these lawyers, in effect, have been given a mo-
nopoly as legal service providers, albeit a monopoly that in all states
has many legal exceptions and is further limited by weak law en-
forcement efforts. There are a dozen or more other businesses and
occupations that legally or illegally are active in providing legal ser-
vices or whose activities in that market are of questionable legality.
A substantial number of lawyers also are active in the legal services
market even though the services they provide clearly or quite possi-
bly violate existing unauthorized practice laws. These include many
lawyers engaged in multijurisdictional law practice and those en-
gaged in multidisciplinary law practice. Also included are house
counsel whose principal office is in a state where these house coun-
sel are not legally admitted or otherwise authorized to practice law.
Improving and enforcing unauthorized law practice restrictions
is almost entirely a state responsibility; federal involvement is very
limited. And, in every state the state's constitution is interpreted as
allocating these responsibilities in large measure to the courts of the
state. In most states, too, the state's constitution is interpreted as al-
locating exceptional power to the courts over unauthorized law prac-
tice matters-power superior to that of the legislative or executive
branches of state government. If the courts and either of the other
branches disagree on any aspect of unauthorized practice law, the
courts' position prevails in most states. Some state courts have not
yet ruled on whether their power over unauthorized practice matters
is superior to that of the other branches but may well go with the
majority superior power position if forced to decide.
A position contrary to that of the majority has been adopted by
. the courts in a few states. This minority position is that all three
branches have concurrent power over unauthorized law practice mat-
ters, but the legislature's position prevails if the courts and the legis-
lature are not in accord. A number of commentators have expressed
support for this minority position, in some instances presumably in-
fluenced by the tendency of most courts that follow the majority po-
sition to construe unauthorized practice laws more favorably to law-
yers than nonlawyers and more favorably to in-state lawyers than
lawyers from out of state. What also may contribute to some com-
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mentators questioning the merits of the majority position is the self-
serving nature of the decisions giving the courts superior power. As
interpreters of ambiguous state constitutional separation of powers
textual provisions, the courts, in effect, are awarding superior power
to themselves.
There is some possibility that the majority position on judicial
power over unauthorized law practice will be reversed or substan-
tially curtailed by state constitutional amendment, federal interven-
tion, or new state court interpretations of the state's constitution-
interpretations that grant the courts only subordinate power over un-
authorized law practice. But none of these possibilities is likely in
the foreseeable future, which means that the dominant power over
unauthorized practice of law in most states will continue to be in the
state's courts, meaning that the courts will continue to have final au-
thority over who may and who may not legally provide legal ser-
vices. Advocates of reform in unauthorized practice laws should,
therefore, concentrate their reform efforts on state courts and on
convincing these courts to make changes in the law that the reform-
ers favor. The approach can be litigation, with the possibility of fa-
vorable caselaw results, or efforts to persuade the courts to adopt
court rules that include the desired changes in the law. This latter
approach may be preferred by some reform advocates because court
rules usually are more comprehensive and inclusive in their cover-
age than case law.
State courts have very substantial power over unauthorized
practice law, but their exercise of that power leaves much to be de-
sired. Improvements are needed in how state courts, especially state
supreme courts, go about making decisions on unauthorized practice
matters. Greater assurance is needed that the courts' decisions are
carefully reasoned and have taken into consideration all relevant in-
formation and alternative arguments. There is a particular need for
improving the decision-making processes of state courts when these
courts are considering adoption of new or revised court rules per-
taining to unauthorized law practice. State court rules on unauthor-
ized practice of law can be preferable to case law in this regulatory
field by providing a much more comprehensive and detailed set of
requirements and exemptions than is likely to emerge from case law.
This can greatly relieve the lack of clarity that has plagued this field
in most states. However, the court rule adoption processes of state
courts have usually lacked the meticulous presentation of data and
diverse arguments that litigation provides. These processes need
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substantial improvement. But even in deciding litigated cases on un-
authorized law practice matters, improvements in the courts' deci-
sion-making processes are needed.
Some proposals for improving the decision-making processes of
state courts in unauthorized law practice matters appear below. No
doubt most of the proposals, if adopted, could result in improved ju-
dicial decision making, not just on unauthorized law practice matters
but on many other kinds of matters as well. Some of the proposals
have already been adopted in some states but merit much wider
adoption.
* More frequent and more open court hearings should be
held in most states when new or revised court rules on unau-
thorized practice are under consideration by the courts. These
hearings should be publicized and all interested parties encour-
aged to attend and to present their views on the rule provisions
under consideration. It should also be made clear to all inter-
ested parties who it is that has final authority to approve or re-
ject changes in the rules, and unauthorized behind-the-scenes
approval or veto power in the governor, chief justice, president
of the state bar association, or anyone else should not be per-
mitted.
* In litigation involving one or more important unauthor-
ized law practice issues, the court before whom the case is
pending should take advantage of every available opportunity to
obtain all the factual information and legal and policy argu-
ments required to make the best decision the court is capable of
making. If the importance of the case merits it, the court
should consider such supplemental aids as extensive use of a
master to more fully consider some aspects of the case107 and
acceptance of, perhaps even inviting, amicus briefs. t08 If
107. Following this approach, see, e.g, In re Opinion No. 26, 654 A.2d 1344, 1347
(N.J. 1995) (referring case to a special master who held sixteen days of hearings and the
master's report was heavily relied on by the court in its decision).
108. Amicus briefs are relatively common in unauthorized practice cases, in some cases
because trade and professional associations often consider such cases relevant to their mem-
bers' interests. See, e.g., Reed v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 789 S.W.2d 19,20
(Mo. 1990) (Associated Industries of Missouri was amicus curiae); In re Opinion No. 26,
654 A.2d 1344, 1345 (N.J. 1995) (a builders league, the state bar association and four
county bar associations were amici curiae); Linder v. Ins. Claims Consultants, 560 S.E.2d
612, 615 (S.C. 2002) (South Carolina Bar and National Association of Public Insurance Ad-
justers were amici curiae.).
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greater clarity seems needed in a wider segment of unauthor-
ized practice law than what deciding the issues before the court
requires, the court should consider adding to its opinion state-
ments that are merely dictum-statements of lesser authority but
that provide supplemental clarification. 109
* In deciding unauthorized practice of law issues, state
court opinions, including most particularly those of state su-
preme courts, should be more carefully and thoroughly rea-
soned. Far too often, the reasoning in these opinions has been
superficial. This is very evident in opinions of courts following
the majority position that the courts' constitutional power over
unauthorized practice of law is superior to that of the other
branches of government. Given the gross ambiguity of most
state constitutional texts on judicial power, the typical reliance
of these courts on their inherent power as the basic rationale for
their superior constitutional power over unauthorized practice
of law is inadequate. In essence, the reasoning of these courts
amounts to no more than "we have the superior power because
we have the superior power." The scope of the courts' power
over unauthorized practice is an important issue and merits a
better justification for its resolution. Those state courts that
have ducked the issue of whether or not their constitutional
power over unauthorized practice of law issues is superior to
that of the other two branches of government also have failed to
fulfill their decision-making responsibilities adequately.
* State supreme courts should limit more extensively the
number of litigated cases that they are willing to hear each
year. They need not go as far as the United States Supreme
Court has gone in limiting case intake, but more limited case
intakes are needed. The prospects for state supreme courts im-
proving their performance in deciding important issues, such as
those concerning unauthorized law practice, would be substan-
tially increased if they had more time to consider those issues.
Almost all state supreme courts take and hear too many cases,
and relief from these overloads is needed. In some states this
109. Certainty in the law generally, including certainty in rules set forth by courts in
their judicial opinions, has been a declared high priority of some judges, thereby enhancing
predictability, a major objective of law. See, e.g .• Paul E. Loving. The Justice afCertainty,
73 OR. L. REV. 743 (1994) (discussing Chief Justice Edwin 1. Peterson's stress on certainty
in his judicial opinions) (the Loving article is part of a symposium tribute to Chief Justice
Peterson at the time of his retirement from the Oregon Supreme Court).
HeinOnline -- 39 Willamette L. Rev. 848 2003
848 WIUAMEITE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:795
will require eliminating mandatory supreme court review re-
quirements. This could necessitate appointing additional inter-
mediate appellate court judges or, in states without intermediate
appellate courts, adding such courts. 110
* More and better state court support staff are needed to
relieve the administrative burden on sitting judges and to act as
research aids to the judges in reaching decisions in litigated
cases, preparing opinions in those cases and considering new or
revised court rules. Additional support staff would be helpful
in enabling state court judges to improve their decision making
on unauthorized practice matters and most other matters as
well. State court judges increasingly are being burdened with
administrative duties as case volumes increase. More and bet-
ter support staff is needed to help relieve this burden and to
give the judges more time for hearing and deciding the cases
before them. Also, state courts, state supreme courts particu-
larly, need more and better support staff to help provide the
background research needed to enable the courts to produce
more carefully and thoroughly reasoned opinions and more
suitable court rules. One means of doing this would be to have
a small group of research experts available to the state's judici-
ary that, on request, would provide data and source materials
that a court believed were needed in deciding a case or prepar-
ing a court rule. Many state legislators have research staff ex-
perts available to assist them in their deliberations, and so
should state courts. Another approach to making more quali-
fied research staff available to state supreme courts would be to
revise the typical state supreme court clerkship system. Instead
of many state supreme court clerks being recent high-ranking
law school graduates hired for only one year, clerks would be
hired who have more experience and more research expertise,
and they would be permanent employees. To attract and retain
those with the requisite qualifications, this approach would re-
quire substantially higher salaries for the clerks, as the present
recent law school graduate positions are low-salaried. 111 The
110. Some states with smaller populations, including Montana and South Dakota, have
no intermediate appellate courts for more important cases.
111. Many New York state courts now have experienced full-time lawyer clerks hired
for indefinite terms at respectable salaries, and there seems to be general satisfaction with
this type of clerkship personnel. On appointment and qualification of court law clerks in
New York, see N.Y. R. CT., R. C.L § 5.1.
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traditional state supreme court clerkship system could also be
revised to make available to the judges a wider range of re-
search help. This could be done by hiring a group of perma-
nent supreme court clerks who are diverse as to knowledge and
expertise, pooling the clerks rather than assigning each clerk to
a particular judge, and permitting any of the supreme court
judges to call on the pool for research help as needed.
* State courts should maintain more cooperative and more
accommodating relations with the other branches of government
on important matters, such as unauthorized law practice, that
are subject to legal control. This can in some instances prove
helpful in avoiding disruptive and contentious interbranch con-
troversies. More significantly, it can expand each branch's un-
derstanding of the problems within its jurisdiction and result in
better solutions to those problems. For example, state courts
may obtain a better perception of how unauthorized law prac-
tice problems can best be resolved from action on these prob-
lems taken by the state's legislature. This should probably be
the determinative reason for the courts, in interpreting the
state's constitution, to reject the interpretation that they have the
sole and exclusive power over unauthorized law practice mat-
ters, rather than concurrent but ultimate power.
* In taking action on unauthorized practice problems, state
courts should place less reliance on views of the organized bar,
including those of their state bar association and those of the
ABA. This is not to say that courts should ignore the recom-
mendations and reactions of the organized bar on unauthorized
practice issues. Organized bar responses to these issues are of-
ten the result of careful analysis of the problems and frequently
reflect not just the interests of lawyers but broader public inter-
ests as well. But the courts should make a greater effort to as-
certain the views of other interest groups, consumers included,
when considering unauthorized practice problems. This can be
done in a variety of ways-for example, by well-publicized
court hearings as proposed above, by invitation to submit rec-
ommendations when new court rules relevant to unauthorized
practice are under consideration and by careful research on
published interest-group positions on unauthorized practice is-
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sues. ll2 Judges are lawyers, and when they appear to be unduly
beholden to the organized bar, their independence and objectiv-
ity are subject to serious question.
Important determinants of the quality, availability and cost of
legal services in every state are the state's unauthorized practice
laws and how vigorously those laws are enforced. The courts in
each state are largely responsible for not only deciding the legal
scope of unauthorized law practice restrictions, but also how power
over unauthorized law practice issues are constitutionally allocated
among the different branches of state government. In addition, state
courts have a significant role in enforcing the laws pertaining to un-
authorized law practice. However, as law makers on unauthorized
law practice matters, both in their opinions in litigated cases and in
their court rules, state courts should do better than they have been
doing. The processes they follow in making their decisions could be
improved; and if needed improvements were made, better and more
trustworthy decisions on unauthorized law practice matters would
follow. Hopefully the courts will make these improvements before
there is a surge of pressure on them by influential pressure groups to
reform the laws concerning unauthorized law practice. Sooner or
later, such pressures seem certain to develop and to include not only
demands that many existing unauthorized law practice restrictions be
changed, but also that the courts reconsider their constitutional in-
terpretations of how much power they have over unauthorized law
practice matters. State supreme courts in particular should improve
their operations and revise their priorities so that, when taking action
on such important matters as unauthorized law practice, they are
functioning up to their full potential.
112. The South Carolina Supreme Court has even taken the unique approach of inviting
declaratory judgment proceedings on unauthorized practice of law questions. At the conclu-
sion of its opinion in In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules, 422 S.E.2d 123 (S.C.
1992), in which the court rejected proposed rules submitted by the state bar association, the
court added:
We urge any interested individual who becomes aware of such conduct [conduct
that may be the unauthorized practice of law] to bring a declaratory judgment ac-
tion in this Court's original jurisdiction to determine the validity of the conduct.
We hope by this provision to strike a proper balance between the legal profession
and other professionals which will ensure the public's protection from the harms
caused by the unauthorized practice of law.
Id. at 125.
